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THE FOURTH TRIMESTER
Saru M. Matambanadzo*
ABSTRACT
This Article introduces a new conceptual framework to the legal literature on preg-
nancy and pregnancy discrimination: the fourth trimester. The concept of a fourth
trimester, drawn from maternal nursing and midwifery, refers to the crucial three to
six month period after birth when many of the physical, psychological, emotional,
and social effects of pregnancy continue. Giving this concept legal relevance ex-
tends the scope of pregnancy beyond the narrow period defined by conception,
gestation, and birth and acknowledges that pregnancy is a relational process, not
an individual event. In the United States, however, antidiscrimination law has
failed to acknowledge the demands of the fourth trimester; it operates from the pre-
sumption that pregnancy begins at conception and ends at birth. Without
employing a fourth trimester framework, the current federal antidiscrimination re-
gime will continue to permit pregnancy discrimination against women because
employers can discriminate on the basis of activities that typify the fourth trimester
of the pregnancy. Judges, administrative actors, movement lawyers, and other pol-
icy makers should recognize that the law should prohibit discrimination on the
basis of fourth trimester activities like breastfeeding, caring for newborn infants, or
recovery. As a matter of law and policy, discrimination arising from these activities
during the fourth trimester should be regarded as pregnancy discrimination.
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ARIA NO. 11
I’m indecently clad, trying to hold the front of my shoddy hospital gown
closed.2 The bright white light of the operating theater has given way to a
1. This Article uses some of the conventions of opera to frame the personal narrative.
These conventions reveal the relationship between the fourth trimester of pregnancy and the
composing of creative work in a disciplined fashion. The modern usage of the word “opera”
derives from the Latin word opus, which denoted “activity, effort, labour, work, a work
produced . . .” Opera Definition, Etymology, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www
.oed.com/view/Entry/131729?rskey=Woj1hU&result=1&isAdvanced=false (last visited
October 22, 2013). The transition from pregnancy to separate personhood is a work of
becoming for mothers and infants. Like an opera, undoing pregnancy during the fourth
trimester has a creative labor of love at the center of its enterprise. And like an opera, the
undoing of pregnancy and the becoming of motherhood is not natural, essential, or
inevitable but is instead a work of art produced through practice and diligence.
2. Throughout this Article, I recount my personal narrative of my fourth trimester with
my daughter. This use of narrative is a methodology widely employed in the diverse traditions
of critical race theory, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Prac-
tice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 741 (1997) (utilizing personal narrative and storytelling to develop a
concept of critical race practice), feminist legal theory, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1992) (employing narrative to highlight the
tensions between race and rights in the United States legal system), and queer legal theory.
Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. & GEN-
DER 57 (2012) (employing personal narrative to deconstruct the sexed nature of mothering).
In these disparate critical traditions, the specificity of personal narrative is used for its poten-
tial to reveal aspects of the universal or the general. E.g., CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY,
FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS: DECOLONIZING THEORY, PRACTICING SOLIDARITY (2003) (noting
how the focusing on the particular experiences of women and girls as a feminist methodol-
ogy has the potential to provide a foundation for a more universal notion of justice while
illuminating struggle, resistance, and marginalization more generally). Feminists claim that
the personal is political, ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND
INSTITUTION x (10th ed. 1986) and the collective process of consciousness-raising is a crucial
method for constructing feminist knowledge. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 83 (1989) (defining consciousness raising as an epistemological project
that is constructed from the “collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women’s
social experience, as women live through it . . . .”). While this methodology may be critiqued
for its essentialist tendencies, Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585-86 (1990), the critical legal tradition has widely adopted the use of
narrative, particularly personal narrative, to ground the production of knowledge. Outside of
the legal academy, feminists employ personal experience and personal narrative in writing
about pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood. E.g., RICH, supra at ix (noting that she “wrote
[the book] as a concrete particular person, and in it [she] used concrete and particular
experiences of women, including [her] own . . . .”). Feminist phenomenology has been par-
ticularly committed to using personal narrative to provide insights that start with a personal
first person account of pregnancy. See e.g., Iris Marion Young, Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity
and Alienation, in THROWING LIKE A GIRL: AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND
SOCIAL THEORY 45 (1990); Sally Fischer, Becoming Bovine: A Phenomenology of Early Motherhood
and Its Practical Political Consequences, in PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES INTO PREGNANCY, CHILD-
BIRTH, AND MOTHERING 191 (Sheila Lintott & Maureen Sander-Staudt eds., 2012). Accounts
of pregnancy in feminist embodiment theory also utilize the specificity of personal narrative
to ground broader general insights about the nature of language, culture, and knowledge.
E.g., ROBBIE PFEUFER KAHN, BEARING MEANING: THE LANGUAGE OF BIRTH 12 (1995) (explain-
ing the author’s use of personal experience to construct knowledge, to illustrate the privilege
and particularities of the writer, to assert agency against structural constrains, and to
FALL 2014] The Fourth Trimester 119
hazy golden Louisiana afternoon. I know I have already delivered Delilah,
and I’m looking for her. Through a cloud of opiates I hear the magnesium
sulfate pumping into me to prevent a seizure. I am suddenly in the grip of
preeclampsia, and my blood pressure is soaring. In spite of it all, I’m talking
on the phone and texting, telling my mother, my sister, my brother, my
friends, that we are ok. The baby and I are ok.
After some time, the lactation nurse brings Delilah to me apologetically,
telling me she came as quickly as she could. The nurse is telling me some-
thing about colostrum—liquid gold now, milk later. I need help to hold the
baby, relying on my nursing pillow. My wrists, like my hips and ankles,
throb from the painful dry twist that was my constant agonizing companion
during the last three months of the gestation. Though modesty has never been
my strong suit, I don’t want to breastfeed in front of the teeming mass of
people in the room. I have no choice. I suck it up as the baby sucks down
colostrum.
Delilah is a tiny perfection, her face simultaneously familiar and new, so
like me and yet different. She is cooing like a dove then growling like a
puppy, rutting for milk. She latches on to my breast greedily, already expres-
sive in her quest. I murmur sing-song words to her, “Darling dove . . . pink
and gold . . . my little Piglet.”
Even with the distraction of Delilah, I am in pain—confused and over-
whelmed. Everything feels wrong. I felt lighter but still profoundly not like
myself. I keep telling myself I am not pregnant. But this—sore breasts, ach-
ing hips and wrists, weeping scar, bleeding, lochia, swollen limbs, high
blood pressure, weakness, and intestinal problems—this is certainly not the
pre-pregnancy state my body remembers. I do not feel unpregnant.
The maternal nurse answers my unasked question and the grimace on my
face, “You took nine months to make your baby. It may take that long to
recover, that long for you to feel like yourself again. You might think of this
time period, nursing and sleeping with Delilah, as the fourth trimester of
your pregnancy.”
The fourth trimester of the pregnancy. That makes sense. And I realize, in
spite of my feminist theory PhD, what I thought I knew about pregnancy is
wrong. What law presumes about pregnancy is wrong. It’s not a nine month
event, with a clear beginning, middle, and end. It does not begin with con-
ception. It does not end at birth. Instead, pregnancy is a process of being and
becoming that defies the rationalization of temporality and demands a differ-
ent logic beyond conceptions of individualism, productivity, and efficiency.
problematize the silencing of women who are mothers). This use of personal narrative places
this piece firmly in the tradition of critical race theory, women of color feminisms, and em-
bodiment theory—scholarly projects, which strive to question the central role of objectivity in
the production of knowledge and demystify the author’s role in constructing the text.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article introduces the concept of the fourth trimester to le-
gal scholarship.3 The fourth trimester is a conceptual framework
drawn from maternal nursing and midwifery that reconstructs preg-
nancy to include a three to six month period of rest, recovery, and
transition after the birth of a child.4 This concept, first introduced
in the early 1970s,5 provides an alternative paradigm for under-
standing the nature of pregnancy beyond the presumption that
pregnancy is a “natural” event that “biology” defines. It focuses on
the crucial social, emotional, and psychological transition process
that occurs after the birth of an infant.
This Article argues that the fourth trimester should be used as a
framework to shape the scope and meaning of pregnancy. It shows
how the current antidiscrimination provisions designed to protect
women from pregnancy discrimination do not adequately provide
for the fourth trimester. With a focus on Title VII as amended by
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Family Medical Leave Act,
the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended by the Affordable Care
Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act as amended by the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), this Article explores how
current antidiscrimination law fails to account for the challenges of
3. Legal scholars addressing pregnancy discrimination have not directly dealt with the
concept of the fourth trimester. With the exception of one article describing the Fourth
Trimester, a San Francisco-based organization providing support for new mothers during the
postpartum period, see Linda Joy Kattwinkel, On Motherhood and Working, 3 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L. J. 1, 24 n.42 (1992), the concept of the fourth trimester does not appear in the
legal literature.
4. See Jill Cohen, The Fourth Trimester, 61 MIDWIFERY TODAY 26 (2002); see also infra Act
I.A. In this Article, I have purposely refused to limit the temporal scope of the fourth trimes-
ter period in order to provide space for responsive individual recovery and adjustment.
Although many define the fourth trimester as a three month period, see Cohen, id (noting
that “[m]idwives refer to the first three months following birth as ‘the fourth trimester’ ”),
some scholars have argued that it may extend for up to six months after delivery. See Jennifer
Benson & Allison Wolf, Where did I Go? The Invisible Postpartum Mother, in PHILOSOPHICAL IN-
QUIRIES INTO PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, AND MOTHERING 191 n.1 (Sheila Lintott & Maureen
Sander-Staudt eds., 2012). There is strong evidence that six weeks is too short for over half of
women to recover from the delivery and to adjust to the demands of the fourth trimester.
Lorraine Tulman & Jacqueline Fawcett, Return of Functional Ability after Childbirth, 37 NURSING
RES. 77 (1988) (arguing that the traditional six-week recovery period should be reconsidered
because it fails to provide enough recovery time for many women after a vaginal delivery and
for the majority of women after a cesarean delivery). Empirical research suggests, however,
that most postpartum difficulties have begun to resolve within six months after the delivery.
Jane F. Thompson et al., Prevalence and Persistence of Health Problems after Childbirth: Associations
with Parity and Method of Birth, 29 BIRTH 83 (2002) (examining longitudinal data concerning
women’s postpartum health with a focus on both emotional and physical well-being).
5. Infra note 31.
FALL 2014] The Fourth Trimester 121
the fourth trimester. The current provisions of federal law and pol-
icy related to pregnancy are woefully inadequate because they force
most women to choose between retaining their place in the labor
market and ensuring that the demands of the fourth trimester are
met. Judges, administrative actors, movement lawyers, and other
policy makers should incorporate the fourth trimester into their
definition of pregnancy. For this reason, the Article also presents
initial suggestions on how to incorporate the fourth trimester to
shape antidiscrimination law, and to better account for the realities
of pregnancy and the needs of pregnant women, infants, and
families.
In introducing the fourth trimester to legal scholarship, this Arti-
cle contributes to a larger feminist literature that challenges the
current antidiscrimination regime by deconstructing and recon-
structing the meaning of pregnancy. Some commentators in this
conversation focus on expanding the meaning of pregnancy be-
yond biology for the purposes of antidiscrimination law. They argue
the meaning of pregnancy is socially constructed, not merely the
product of some natural pre-cultural truth.6 These scholars also in-
terrogate the scope and meaning of pregnancy in an effort to
provide an expansive definition of pregnancy beyond narrow no-
tions of biological essentialism.7 Some challenge the notion that
pregnancy is an individual endeavor, focusing on its relational as-
pects.8 Many argue that the legal understanding of pregnancy fails
to account for the social, economic, and psychological aspects of
pregnancy.9
6. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1992).
7. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to
Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 329, 373 (2009) (arguing feminists should not bifurcate
pregnancy into its physical and social components); Dan Danielsen, Representing Identities:
Legal Treatment of Pregnancy and Homosexuality, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1453, 1453 n.3 (1992)
(using pregnancy as a “metaphor for the locus of social, personal and legal relations of and
to women’s biological sex, gender, reproductive desires, capacities or conditions” in order to
unpack the meaning of pregnancy without reducing pregnancy to women’s reproductive
capabilities).
8. Hendricks, supra note 7, at 362 (arguing that the relationship model of pregnancy
reveals how forced pregnancy should be understood as “hijacking the body to force the crea-
tion of an intimate caretaking relationship”); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1017 (1984) (claiming even when the relationship ends after the birth
of the child, pregnancy creates a “profoundly intimate relationship between the woman and
the child”).
9. Reva Siegel, for example, argues that the Supreme Court adopted this presump-
tion—that pregnancy is biological and natural—in its approach to reproductive rights. Siegel
argues that the Court has adopted a presumption of what she terms “physiological natural-
ism,” de-emphasizing how the social costs of pregnancy are imposed upon women through
social and cultural mechanisms. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: An Historical Perspective
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This Article also contributes to a robust scholarly conversation
highlighting the inadequacies of the available pregnancy discrimi-
nation protections in the United States. Some scholars argue that
federal courts incorrectly interpret the antidiscrimination law of
pregnancy by adopting a perspective that centersaround men and
male experiences with illness, not women’s experiences with preg-
nancy.10 Other scholars claim that current interpretations of the
federal pregnancy discrimination law, particularly the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, rely on pregnancy blindness and require
women to remain fully capable of performing all job duties during
their pregnancies and permitting differential treatment if they are
less than capable of doing so.11 Many scholars provide evidence that
these federal schemes are ineffective, in part, because the judiciary
has narrowly interpreted the statutes.12 Other scholars suggest the
law should require employers to make reasonable accommodations
for pregnant employees in the workplace.13 Many scholars argue for
an expansion of maternity leave and benefits to alleviate the costs of
on Abortion Rights and the Question of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 265 (1992) (arguing
that the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is based on a presumption of physiological
naturalism which fails to account for the ways in which gender roles shape the inequalities
and differences of pregnancy); see also Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive
Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 817 (2007)
(arguing for increased attention to the social and cultural aspects of pregnancy); but see,
Judith G. Greenburg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating Discrimination Against Preg-
nant Women in the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REV. 225, 229 (noting that biological processes are not
easily disentangled from the social construction of pregnancy).
10. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act at 35, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 67 (2013) (adopting an intersectional social
justice approach to focus on women who need and want to work but who face a maternal wall
because of the way employers structure the workplace); Jessica Carvey Manners, Note, The
Search for Mr. Troupe: The Need to Eliminate Comparison Groups in Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Cases, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 209 (2005) (drawing from European Union law to argue that the
requirement for a comparator in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) should be
eliminated).
11. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J.
567, 610 (2010) (arguing the failures of antidiscrimination law to address the realities of
pregnancy with accommodations limits women’s access to equal citizenship).
12. Michelle D. Deardoff, Beyond Pregnancy: Litigating Infertility, Contraception, and
Breastfeeding in the Workplace, 32 J. WOMEN POL. & POL’Y 52 (2011) (examining how statutory
interpretation has limited the expansion of pregnancy discrimination protections); Julie
Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 38 AM.
BUS. L.J. 819 (2001) (arguing that the courts narrowly interpret the PDA to deny families the
protections that Congress intended with the passage of the act); see also Sally J. Kenney, Preg-
nancy Discrimination: Toward Substantive Equality, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 351 (1995) (arguing
that gaps exist between the potential promises of antidiscrimination law and the perspectives
of judges and employers on accommodating pregnancy).
13. Deborah Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the
Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961 (2013) (arguing that the
PDA creates a substantive accommodation right because it requires employers who accom-
modate employees who are limited in their ability to work to accommodate pregnant
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the period after the gestation of the infant.14 Some even propose
that various forms of social insurance should be mobilized to
spread the costs of accommodating pregnant women in the work-
place.15 Others suggest that public policy reasons focused on child
welfare, rather than preventing workplace discrimination, should
motivate the accommodation of pregnancy in the workplace.16 And
some scholars even argue that a more expansive understanding of
pregnancy requires that scholars and policy makers conceptually
disentangle pregnancy from its focus on women.17 While some
scholars incorporate aspects of pregnancy’s fourth trimester in
employees regardless of the reason for the accommodation); Deborah A. Calloway, Accommo-
dating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that the workplace
should accommodate pregnancy in order to ensure the health and well-being of children).
There is some debate as to whether accommodation and antidiscrimination are two distinct
concepts or if the two concepts are overlapping or complementary, see Christine Jolls, Antidis-
crimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 645 (2001) (making the claim that the
two concepts are overlapping). But see Joan Williams & Nancy Segel, Beyond the Maternal Wall:
Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 115 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77
(2003) (arguing that there is a sharp distinction between accommodation and antidis-
crimination principles).
14. Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex
Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 417–18 (2011) (arguing that feminist activists cam-
paigned to distribute economic and social costs of reproduction more evenly).
15. Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1994) (arguing that a system similar to unem-
ployment compensation should be employed to spread the cost of pregnancy and
accommodate pregnant workers in the workplace).
16. Deborah Calloway argues, for example, that while equal employment opportunities
for women are not irrelevant, “[a]ccommodating pregnancy in the workplace is a child wel-
fare issue, not an equal employment issue.” Calloway, supra note 13, at 24 (arguing that the
PDA and the Americans with Disabilities Act should be interpreted to require employers to
accommodate pregnancy in the workplace).
17. One commentator has recently argued that feminists should adopt critical trans or
masculinity study’s approach to approaching the law of pregnancy discrimination, arguing
that pregnancy should be conceived apart from biological notions of sex. Lara Karaian, Preg-
nant Men: Repronormativity, Critical Trans Theory and the Re(conceive)ing of Sex and Pregnancy in
Law, 22 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 211 (2013). See also Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward
a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57 (2012) (deploying the notion of un-
sexing to attack the linkage between biology and sex roles in the context of mothering).
Although pregnancy is not universally a female endeavor across the animal kingdom, in
mammals, only female members of a species can become pregnant. Kai N. Sto¨ltling &
Anthony B. Wilson, Male Pregnancy in Seahorses and Pipefishes: Beyond the Mammalian Model, 29
BIOESSAYS 884, 884 (2007) (describing how researchers who were previously hesitant to
ascribe pregnancy to seahorses are now coming to understand the similarities between preg-
nancy in mammals and pregnancy in syngnathid fish). Perhaps for this reason, pregnancy is a
process endowed with gendered meaning, and it presents complex emotional, legal, and
social challenges for transgender individuals who identify as men but wish to retain and use
their reproductive organs. Sam Dylan More, The Pregnant Man—An Oxymoron?, 7 J. GENDER
STUD. 319 (1998) (describing qualitative interviews with transmen who became pregnant).
For many masculine identified lesbians, pregnancy may disrupt a “masculine ableness” that is
central to their identities. Maura Ryan, The Gender of Pregnancy: Masculine Lesbians Talk about
Reproduction, 17 J. LESBIAN STUD. 119, 128–30 (2013) (describing perceptions of childless
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their calls for a more responsive antidiscrimination regime,18 this
Article is the first to engage with the fourth trimester framework
midwives and maternal nurses utilize as a tool for shaping preg-
nancy discrimination law in the United States.
ARIA NO. 2
My mind feels incredibly clear, but my body is muddled. I am deflated
and defeated, still not feeling unpregnant. The parking lot illuminates my
room and I lie awake. My nightly cast of haunting spirits includes residents,
interns, medication nurses, and baby nurses who interrupt my sleep with
care. I am desperate for Delilah to “room in” with me, but in my drug-
induced condition this is impossible. When Delilah visits, she latches on,
grunting and growling in an effort to coax milk from my tired body.
It’s been more than a week. Delilah is visiting the pediatrician for the first
time. The sweet doctor, with her pretty eyes and kind voice, tells me how
Delilah has lost weight as she waits for my milk to come in. In spite of the
fact that I am doing my best, a few tears willfully roll down my cheeks.
Delilah must have been starving. I have failed her.
On day fourteen, Delilah sleeps in her snuggle nest beside me. I have
given up trying to sleep apart from her because we sleep better together. I
wake with a start, three hours from the last feeding. I wake because she has
rolled over and sighed, probably vexed over some neonatal discomfort. It will
not be the first or last time that we will spend the night waking and sleeping
together, our dreams flowing between us as our hearts beat toward a comple-
mentary rhythm.
ACT I: DEFINING THE FOURTH TRIMESTER
The fourth trimester describes a postpartum period of recovery,
restoration, and re-imagination. Under this framework, pregnancy
and the process of childbearing extend beyond the birth and into
the first three months after delivery, and sometimes beyond.19 Con-
ceptually, the fourth trimester provides important recognition that
masculine lesbians, androgynous lesbians, and trans-identified lesbians who use strategies of
rejecting pregnancy and redefining pregnancy to negotiate their relationship to it).
18. E.g., Grossman, supra note 11, at 578 (arguing pregnant women are subject to two
contradictory presumptions—the presumption of uninterrupted capacity and the presump-
tion of severe limitations).
19. See REVA RUBIN, MATERNAL IDENTITY AND THE MATERNAL EXPERIENCE 100 (1984) (not-
ing delivery is the climax but not the end of the physical, social, and emotional aspects of
childbearing experiences).
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the transformative process of pregnancy, birth, and motherhood re-
quires time and care during this period of adjustment.
Often the notion of the fourth trimester is adopted without any
further explanation.20 This Section of the Article provides a theoret-
ical examination of the fourth trimester, tracing the concept from
its origins in maternal nursing and midwifery. The fourth trimester
describes two interrelated phenomena that occur during the first
three to six months after the infant’s birth. First, it identifies the
complex social, emotional, and physical transition to recovery for
mothers and provides a framework to guide midwives and maternal
nurses in administering care to these women. Second, it illuminates
the social, emotional, and physical vulnerability of newborn infants
to aid parents.
ARIA NO. 3
I have begun to shed pounds of fluids, but the joint pain remains relent-
less. I am almost immobilized, barely able to walk, and my hips, wrists, and
knees creak like the tattered pine floorboards in our house. At my check-up, I
ask for more pain medication, but I don’t cry. I save it for the car on the way
home.21
Sometimes I am only food to Delilah. Our relationship is mediated
through milk. I worry constantly about supply problems and other catastro-
phes. I talk to a La Leche League leader who has breastfed eleven children.
She is smug, self-assured, and righteous. After I get off the phone, I yell at my
poor husband about getting a vasectomy. He goes to sleep confused.
My best friend calls me while I rock in the nursery, surrounded by lovingly
given gifts. I’ve been nursing for over thirty minutes at a time approximately
every two hours. My breasts strain under the constant demand for milk, but
I am thankful. They are not bleeding or cracked. The growth spurts are
20. E.g., Margot Edwards, The Crises of the Fourth Trimester, 1 BIRTH & FAMILY J. 19 (1973)
(using the fourth trimester in the title and in the article without explanation to characterize
the postpartum period). This lack of theoretical explanation is common throughout the
field. This occurs not only in textbooks, see SHANNON E. PERRY ET AL., MATERNAL CHILD NURS-
ING CARE (4th ed. 2010) (using “the fourth trimester” as the title for the chapter on
postpartum nursing care) but also in academic sources like dissertations. See, e.g., Hatleen M.
Sonnesyn, A Study of Fourth Trimester Concerns and Resources Utilized to Meet Identified
Concerns (May 1980) (unpublished M.S. thesis, North Dakota State University of Agriculture
and Applied Science); Diane C. Kruse, Anticipatory Guidance in Fourth Trimester Adjust-
ment (May 1976) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Arizona State University).
21. The pain of pregnancy and birth is often a silenced or unacknowledged aspect of
pregnancy even though it is a very salient aspect of the fourth trimester. See, e.g., Lisa Skitol-
sky, Tales from the Tit: The Moral and Political Implications of Useless Lactational Suffering, in
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES INTO PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, AND MOTHERING 64 (Sheila Lintott &
Maureen Sander-Staudt eds., 2012).
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killing me, I confess to her. When she asks how I am, I feel so ungrateful and
so selfish, but I cannot hold back. I tell her I’m a horrible mother and I
cannot do this. This baby nurses too much and it hurts. And while I love
Delilah, I resent every minute. Why is it so hard?
A. The Fourth Trimester for Mothers
In 1975, Reva Rubin, one of the pioneers of maternal nursing,22
argued that the most significant failure of modern obstetric care
occurs during the postpartum period.23 According to Rubin, the
postpartum period in the United States is an especially cruel time.24
It is a period of intense physical, psychological, emotional, and so-
cial changes for the mother.25 In this recovery and restoration
period, mothers often limp along without support, experiencing a
time of profound dependency while the other family members
22. Reva Rubin’s work in maternal nursing was crucial in establishing the field, although
scholars in nursing have widely criticized it. For example, some have criticized Rubin’s work
on the stages of maternal identity development for its lack of specificity and its use of a
Freudian theoretical framework. Janice Templeton Gay & Ann Bragg Douglas, Reva Rubin
Revisited, 17 J. OBSTETRIC GYNECOLOGICAL & NEONATAL NURSING 394, 394–95 (1988). Her
conclusions about maternal behavior, observed during the period spanning the 1950s
through the early 1970s, also do not reflect the changes the current consumer model of
childbirth have wrought, which combines increased participation and access to delivery
choices. See id. at 397. Rubin’s work also does not necessarily account for intersectional con-
siderations of gender, race, class, or disability status, and her theory of maternal role
attainment may not apply universally to all women, see Katherine Ferrell Fouquier, State of the
Science: Does the Theory of Maternal Role Attainment Apply to African American Motherhood?, 58 J.
MIDWIFERY & MATERNAL HEALTH 203 (2013) (presenting empirical research that Rubin’s the-
ory of maternal role attainment does not apply to African American women) and may not be
an especially useful concept for contemporary maternal nursing. Louise K. Martell, Is Reva
Rubin’s “Taking-In” and “Taking-Hold” a Useful Paradigm, 17 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 1
(1996) (arguing that Rubin’s theory has only limited potential for contemporary women).
However, even Rubin’s critics acknowledge that Rubin’s work created the field of maternal
nursing, inspired empirical research in nursing focused on maternal behavior and roles, and
led to changes in hospital practices related to “rooming-in” and postpartum education. Id.;
see also J. Michael Elliot, Obituary: Reva Rubin, 76, Nursing Expert, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 1995),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/17/obituaries/reva-rubin-76-nursing-expert
.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C{%221%22%3A%22RI%3A9%22}.
23. Reva Rubin, Maternity Nursing Stops Too Soon, 75 AM, J. NURSING 1680, 1684 (1975).
24. The fourth trimester has been characterized as a transitional time rife with potential
crises and challenges for the new family generally and the new mother in particular. Ed-
wards, supra note 20, at 19.
25. See ELIZABETH DAVIS, HEART & HANDS A MIDWIFE’S GUIDE TO PREGNANCY AND BIRTH
190 (2004) (noting that improper care can have long term effects on a woman’s body, sexual-
ity, and personality). Some commentators characterize this period of time as a series of
dynamic processes geared toward the development of a new (ultimately) separate life and the
preservation and evolution of the individual woman’s life to accommodate a child. Rubin,
supra note 23.
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flounder.26 For this reason, “[w]hat mothers need is a chance to
recover themselves before they assume full care of a newborn and
assume their other responsibilities. What mothers need is a healthy
baby who has completed the transition from uterine to extrauterine
living.”27 According to Rubin, this transition between pregnancy
and motherhood requires a recognition that physical, social, and
psychological aspects of pregnancy continue beyond birth. The
transitional continuation of physical, social, and psychological as-
pects of pregnancy requires that mothers and their families receive
care and support during the postpartum period.
The fourth trimester framework emerged as a partial answer to
this critique; it informs the ways in which nurses provide care, in-
struction, and information to women who have given birth28 and to
their partners.29 The literature written for maternal nurses, mid-
wives,30 and educators in these professions began to outline their
roles in the fourth trimester framework in the mid 1970s.31 During
the postpartum period—the intense period of recovery and accli-
mation32 that the woman, her partner, and infant experience—
health professionals are required to continue responsive and nur-
turing communication with the woman and provide continual
health assessments on the basis of this communication.33
The physical, social, emotional, and psychological transitions af-
ter birth and gestation are especially difficult for mothers, infants,
and families because they can exacerbate existing vulnerabilities.34
Intense psychological and emotional aspects also accompany the
26. DAVIS, supra note 25.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 20 (using “the fourth trimester” as the title for the chapter
on postpartum nursing care).
29. Id. at 533 (noting that the objective of nursing care during this period is to provide
care to women and their partners). In some cases, the extension of nursing care to the family
is made explicit during the fourth trimester. DEITRA LEONARD LOWDERMILK, MATERNITY NURS-
ING (8th ed., 2010) (using the title “Nursing Care of the Family During the Fourth Trimester”
to describe the postpartum approach to nursing care and instruction).
30. E.g., Cohen, supra note 4.
31. The earliest article found by the author is from 1973. Edwards, supra note 20; see also
Lynn George, Lack of Preparedness: Experiences of First-Time Mothers, 30 AM. J. MATERNAL/CHILD
NURSING 251, 252 (2005) (tracing the concept of the fourth trimester to Reva Rubin’s 1975
work on maternal nursing).
32. E.g., Edwards, supra note 20 (arguing that the fourth trimester is a transitional pe-
riod of crisis for a family).
33. Nancy E. Donaldson, Fourth Trimester Follow-up, 77 AM. J. NURSING 1176, 1178 (1977).
34. Sheila Kitzinger, The Fourth Trimester?, 11 MIDWIFE, HEALTH VISITOR & COMMUNITY
NURSE 118 (1975). According to Kitzinger, the fourth trimester is characterized not only by
physical changes but also by emotional vulnerabilities and intense social and psychological
growth. Often during the fourth trimester, the intense physical and emotional needs of the
infant combined with physical changes, means that families in general, and women in partic-
ular, will need postpartum support during this critical time. Id.
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physical recovery. Many women experience negative feelings about
their bodies during this time period or struggle with the limitations
of physical recovery.35 Some women also face problems with sexual
function during the postpartum period.36 Research suggests that
education, follow-up care, and communication can minimize the
crisis that the woman and her family face during the fourth trimes-
ter.37 By adopting a fourth trimester framework, maternal nurses
and midwives caring for newborns and their mothers recognize that
pregnancy is a process that does not necessarily end with the birth
of the infant.38
The fourth trimester period includes a significant physical recov-
ery during the first six to eight weeks after birth, often labeled the
perperium.39 The perperium starts with the completion of labor
and ends when the woman’s reproductive system returns to a “nor-
mal nonpregnant state.”40 This involves the involution, or
shrinking, of the uterus from its post-pregnancy size to its normal
pre-pregnancy size.41 Involution typically occurs over a six-week pe-
riod, although breastfeeding on demand can hasten the process.42
During the postpartum period, physical changes also include the
expulsion of lochia and vaginal bleeding that lasts for several weeks
after the pregnancy ends.43 Return to a “normal nonpregnant state”
may also include the repositioning of internal organs that shifted to
35. Sofia Rallis et al., Predictors of Body Image during the First Year Postpartum: A Prospective
Study, 45 WOMEN & HEALTH 87 (2007) (showing how women experience greater body dissat-
isfaction during the postpartum period).
36. Rachel N. Pauls et al., Effects of Pregnancy on Female Sexual Function and Body Image, 5 J.
SEXUAL MED. 1915 (2008) (finding that women experience poor sexual function during the
postpartum period and that this lack of sexual function can continue for more than six
months after birth).
37. DAVIS, supra note 25 (noting that improper care can have long term effects on a
woman’s body, sexuality and personality). In providing a model for guiding postpartum com-
munication follow-ups during the fourth trimester, Nancy Donaldson noted that the
assessments of nursing during that period made a “critical difference” to the “concerned and
confused” families dealing with the challenges of a new infant. Donaldson, supra note 33, at
1178; see also Nancy E. Donaldson, The Postpartum Follow-up Nurse Clinician, 10 J. OBSTETRICS
GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 249, 250 (1981).
38. Alison Stuebe, Establishing a Fourth Trimester, 12 BREASTFEEDING MED. 45 (2013) (ar-
guing that health care providers should take the fourth trimester of pregnancy as seriously as
the preceding three).
39. Marcia Gruis, Beyond Maternity: Postpartum Concerns of Mothers, 2 AM. J. MATERNAL
CHILD NURSING 182, 182 (1977).
40. Id.
41. DAVIS, supra note 25, at 192.
42. JAN RIORDAN & KAREN WAMBACH, BREASTFEEDING AND HUMAN LACTATION 90 (4th ed.
2010) (describing the hormonal and physical reaction to breastfeeding and illustrating the
link between breastfeeding and uterine contractions, thereby speeding up the involution
process).
43. World Health Organization, The WHO Multinational Study of Breastfeeding and Lacta-
tional Amenorrhea: IV. Postpartum Bleeding and Lochia in Breastfeeding Women, in WORLD HEALTH
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make room for the expansion of the uterus and changes in the uri-
nary and gastrointestinal tracks.44 For most women, particularly
those who delivered vaginally, the return to a “normal nonpregnant
state” also involves recovery of the labia, vagina, and perineum
area.45 Women recovering from cesarean section may face intense
recovery challenges related to the incision’s healing, including in-
creased risk of infection.46 Women who are breastfeeding may also
experience physical changes of the nipples and hormonal changes
related to lactation.47 Many of these physical changes also come
with a decrease in some pregnancy-related hormones, including
progesterone and estrogen,48 and an increase in hormones like pro-
lactin that facilitate successful breastfeeding.49 As a theoretical
framework, the fourth trimester extends the scope of care for
nurses, midwives, or other caregivers beyond gestation and birth50
and describes a way for health professionals to provide assessments
and continual care for women during this time period.51
In employing a fourth trimester framework, midwives, lactation
consultants, and maternal nurses re-conceptualize the end of preg-
nancy and the beginning of motherhood as a process of gradual
physical and emotional changes. The mother, after giving birth, be-
comes less pregnant over time. Becoming physically less pregnant
also entails the evolution of separateness between mother and baby.
During this transition, new mothers go through a period where
they must care intensely for their own recovery and evolution into a
new role, as well as the well-being and development of their infants.
ORGANIZATION TASK FORCE ON METHODS FOR THE NATURAL REGULATION OF FERTILITY 441-47
(1999).
44. PATRICIA A. CREEHAN & KATHLEEN RICE SIMPSON, PRENATAL NURSING 69 (2008).
45. DIETRA LEONARD LOWDERMILK ET AL., MATERNITY & WOMEN’S HEALTH CARE 470 (10th
ed. 2012); A.H. DECHERNEY ET AL., CURRENT DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT: OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY (10th ed. 2007).
46. See V. Berghella, Cesarean Delivery: Postoperative Issues, UPTODATE, http://www.upto
date.com/contents/cesarean-delivery-postoperative-issues?source=search_result&search=cae
sarian+delivery+postoperative&selectedTitle=1~150 (last visited Aug. 28, 2014); P. Berens,
Overview of Postpartum Care, UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/contents/overview-of-post
partum-care?source=search_result&search=overview+of+postpartum+care&selectedTitle=1~
150 (last visited Aug. 28, 2014); THE AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, FAQ:
Cesarean Birth, http://www.acog.org/~/media/For%20Patients/faq006.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20140
731T0351331443 (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
47. JAN RIORDAN, BREASTFEEDING AND HUMAN LACTATION 75 (3rd ed. 2005).
48. Margaret C. Neville et al., Studies in Human Lactation: Milk Volumes in Lactating Women
During the Onset of Lactation and Full Lactation, 48 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1375, 1383
(1988).
49. RIORDAN, supra note 47.
50. Donaldson, supra note 37; Cohen, supra note 4.
51. E.g., Donaldson, supra note 33, at 1176 (providing details concerning the role and
functions of a nurse after birth including the charge to “[m]ake assessments relating to the
fourth trimester”).
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According to veteran midwife Beth Bailey Barbeau, it takes months
after birth, not weeks or days, for a family to return to some sem-
blance of normalcy.52 The postpartum check-up at six weeks, which
often marks the medical end of the pregnancy for insurance com-
panies and Obstetrics and Gynecology doctors, occurs only halfway
into the average restoration period of the fourth trimester. Recov-
ery from pregnancy may take up to nine months for some women.53
The fourth trimester framework advises those who care for women
after the birth of a child to treat these women individually and re-
spond to their unique needs.54
The fourth trimester recognizes an interdependent mother-in-
fant dyad in the first three to six months after birth. Mothers and
newborns constitute a unit, which Rubin calls the “mother-child
subsystem.”55 The mother-child subsystem fosters the infant’s transi-
tion from the uterus to the outside world and effectively integrates
the newborn into the family structure.56 This recognizes that
women who have given birth are dealing not only with an intense
physical recovery, but also with the evolution of separateness be-
tween themselves and their babies.57 Some medical professionals
describe the fourth trimester as a time of unity and “oneness” be-
tween the mother and child.58 According to Christaine Northrup,
“mother and child are still very much a physical unit, [their] bodies
in synchrony with each other . . .” during the fourth trimester.59
Mothers recounting their experiences with this phenomenon de-
scribe being in sync with their infants, feeling that they are “wired”
to their child.60
This feeling is not merely emotional. The new infant’s body is
responsive to the bodies of those that hold and care for it.61 Be-
cause infants are unable to self-regulate many of their basic
biological functions, their bodies learn to regulate their heart rate,
blood pressure, sleep cycles, skin temperature, and brain chemistry
from close contact with the bodies of others.62 Through physical
52. Beth Bailey Barbeau, Time in a Bottle, 97 Midwifery Today 42, 68 (2011).
53. RUBIN, supra note 19, at 109 (according to Reva Rubin, women do not feel whole,
functional, and intact until nine months after the birth).
54. Cohen, supra note 4, at 26 (noting that “[m]idwives refer to the first three months
following birth as ‘the fourth trimester’ ”).
55. RUBIN, supra note 19, at 101.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. CHRISTAINE NORTHRUP, MOTHER-DAUGHTER WISDOM CREATING A LEGACY OF PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HEALTH 119 (2005).
59. RUBIN, supra note 19, at 101.
60. NORTHRUP, supra note 58. at 119–20.
61. Id. at 121.
62. Id.
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contact with their mothers or other caregivers, infants obtain physi-
ological help in self-regulating these essential cycles.
The physical, emotional, and psychological links between the in-
fant and its primary caregiver can confuse individuals socialized to
believe they are independent individuals. Lisa Catherine Harper re-
counts in her memoir Double Life the complexities mothers face as
they separate themselves from the newly born infant that emerged
from their bodies. She notes, “I had trouble understanding where
she had come from. First she was inside me and then outside me. . .
She was mine, and yet she wasn’t.”63 The process of pregnancy ren-
ders a woman simultaneously an individual and a crucial part of a
dyad—mother and child.64 Mothers who have given birth to infants
experience the separation and individuation of the infant as a
process.65
The fourth trimester is a period of complex change and contra-
diction for mothers. Mother and infant are entangled in a web of
interdependency with demanding physical and emotional elements
while being separate individuals. During this period, mothers often
live lives of intense beauty and disturbing ugliness, where the harsh
confrontational cruelties of colic or cracking nipples can quickly
undo the preciousness of miniature toes and tiny eyelashes. Fourth
trimester time moves irregularly. Unforgettable moments of panic
are juxtaposed against endless moments where nothing seems to
happen and time stands still. Thirty minutes of nursing may last a
painful and excruciating eternity while five hours of deep sleep flies
by instantaneously.
During the period of the fourth trimester, women often report
being unprepared for the intense responsibilities of caring for an
63. LISA CATHERINE HARPER, A DOUBLE LIFE: DISCOVERING MOTHERHOOD 169 (2011)
(designating the “arduous” first six weeks after birth as the fourth trimester). In breastfeed-
ing her eager and hungry infant Ella, Harper characterizes the time that she and her
daughter spent breastfeeding as a “glimpse of that paradise we had lost.” Id. at 175.
64. Following the work of Martha Fineman, I purposely choose to designate this dyad as
mother and child. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230–33 (1995). This choice is not meant to essential-
ize women as mothers but to highlight the unique dependencies the biological, social, and
psychological process of care and its costs created. Men or women who fulfill the intense
caring roles with children, whether their bonds stem from the process of pregnancy or not,
may adopt the role of mother in this dyad, and they may incur the costs and benefits of this
relationship. Feminists have shown how the social role of caring for and rearing children can
be disaggregated from gestation and childbirth and how this social role is not natural or
inevitable for women. M.M. Slaughter, The Legal Construction of Mother, in MOTHERS IN LAW
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 73–74 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995).
65. Gruis, supra note 39, at 184 (noting that “through touching and caring for the baby,
[the mother] begins to identify him as a whole, separate individual”).
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infant while experiencing fatigue and the pain of recovery.66 Due to
the intense nature of the recovery and bonding experience, it is
often difficult to determine where physical changes end and emo-
tional and psychological changes begin.67 Emotional changes
related to the new role of being a mother or completing a preg-
nancy include times of elation and intensity, and feelings of
helplessness and inadequacy.68 In the next section, the Article fo-
cuses on the fourth trimester and its challenges for infants.
ARIA NO. 4
As weeks pass, Delilah has taken her rightful place upon the throne. She
is our queen—as beautiful and terrible as a summer thunderstorm. She
sleeps when she pleases, eats when she pleases, and requires constant diaper
changes. Delilah is alert and curious, with strong preferences. The pediatri-
cian says she is gaining weight well, but typical for a breastfed baby, she is
always hungry. She refuses to sleep more than two hours at a time, and she
nurses every ninety minutes.
I track her bowel movements and wet diapers obsessively, like a courtier. I
cannot drink enough water, and I feel I am being slowly consumed. And
between the abdominal incision and the joint pain, I’m severely limited in
my capacity.
My partner diapers, rocks, and burps Delilah in a frenzy. He is perfect
because he has to be.
B. The Fourth Trimester for Infants
Although the fourth trimester began as recognition of the transi-
tional challenges women face during the early days after the
gestation and birth, recent articulations of the fourth trimester
have shifted focus from the mother to the infant. The fourth trimes-
ter is also a crucial time period for infant brain development and
66. George, supra note 31, at 253–54.
67. BRENDA KRAUSE EHEART, THE FOURTH TRIMESTER: ON BECOMING A MOTHER 67
(1983).
68. Circumstances may intensify these negative feelings for a variety of reasons. For ex-
ample, women who have been become pregnant against their will through coercion or rape
may have even more difficulty negotiating the physical and emotional challenges of the
fourth trimester. See A. Rachel Camp, Coercing Pregnancy (May. 29, 2014) (unpublished
article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388982 (arguing that current legal
frameworks of domestic violence are inadequate to deal with the circumstances of forced
reproduction); see also, Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy is an Injury: Rape, Law, and Culture,
65 STAN. L. REV. 457 (2013) (examining laws that punish sexual assaults resulting in preg-
nancy more heavily than sexual assaults that do not result in pregnancy).
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stimulation.69 In a book that focuses on the fourth trimester for in-
fants, medical journalist Susan Brink presents an accessible
overview of cutting-edge research on infant development from an
interdisciplinary perspective, including evolutionary biology, an-
thropology, and epidemiology. Augmenting her research with
interviews of parents and leading scholars, Brink presents a compi-
lation of evidence that reveals how an infant’s early life closely
resembles the neonate’s in-utero experience.70 She argues that the
first three months of the infant’s post-gestation life should be con-
sidered an extension of the pre-birth conditions, i.e., a fourth
trimester.71 According to Brink, during this fourth trimester “[a]
newborn human is not so much a baby as a final-phase fetus living
through a time of transition.”72 This transition requires a close, con-
sistent, responsive relationship between the infant and the mother
or caregiver that mirrors the biologically binding closeness of the
pre-birth relationship. The infant’s continual development requires
constant, attentive care to foster the crucial cognitive, physical, and
emotional changes it is experiencing.73 Although Brink leaves many
specific policy recommendations unstated, she indicates that this
stage requires more family support and should include paid paren-
tal leave for infant caretaking.74
The concept of the fourth trimester is often used as self-help for
new parents to conceptualize typical experiences in the first three
months of the postpartum period75 or in memoirs recounting
women’s experiences of gestation, childbirth, and motherhood.76
The fourth trimester has even been used humorously to frame the
challenges of this transitional period.77 Often when used in this
69. See Jennifer Marshall, Infant Neurosensory Development: Considerations for Infant Child
Care, 39 EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUC. J. 175 (2011).
70. See SUSAN BRINK, THE FOURTH TRIMESTER: UNDERSTANDING, PROTECTING, AND NUR-
TURING AN INFANT THROUGH THE FIRST THREE MONTHS (2013).
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 5–7.
74. Id. at 14.
75. E.g., GALE PRYOR & KATHLEEN HUGGINS, NURSING MOTHER, WORKING MOTHER: THE
ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO BREASTFEEDING YOUR BABY BEFORE AND AFTER YOU RETURN TO WORK 57
(2nd ed. 2007) (employing the chapter title “Life on Leave: The Fourth Trimester” without
explanation to describe the postpartum process of bonding and breastfeeding); see also
Jeanne Warren Lindsay & Jean Brunelli, YOUR PREGNANCY AND NEWBORN JOURNEY: A GUIDE
FOR PREGNANT TEENS, 132 (2004); ANNE SEMANS & CATHY WINKS, THE MOTHER’S GUIDE TO
SEX: ENJOYING YOUR SEXUALITY THROUGH ALL STAGES OF MOTHERHOOD, 138 (2001).
76. E.g., HARPER, supra note 63, at 167.
77. AMY EINHORN, THE FOURTH TRIMESTER: AND YOU THOUGHT LABOR WAS HARD . . .
ADVICE, HUMOR, AND INSPIRATION FOR NEW MOMS ON SURVIVING THE FIRST SIX WEEKS—AND
BEYOND (2001).
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context, the concept is not fully explained or attributed to any aca-
demic source.78
Pediatricians also use the fourth trimester framework to aid par-
ents dealing with unexplained crying or fussiness during the first
three months of life. For infants, the fourth trimester encompasses
the first three to four months outside of the womb when the infant
is negotiating its earliest encounters with its caregivers and the
broader world.79 Dr. Harvey Karp, in his self-help book for parents,
claims that unexplained crying, fussiness, and colic during the first
three months, occur because even after forty full weeks of gestation,
human infants leave the womb “too soon.”80 According to Karp,
human infants, unlike other mammals, are born approximately
three months before they properly mature in order to ensure that
women can safely deliver them.81 In recognition of the fourth tri-
mester, many health care professionals call infants neonates82 or
external fetuses during the first three months.83 Because human in-
fants are all born relatively immature, Karp contends that parents
should provide some of the same sensations infants enjoyed in the
womb to soothe even the fussiest or most colic-prone newborns.84
Although the anthropological foundations of Dr. Karp’s claims can
be regarded as problematic,85 this fourth trimester framework of
care has worked for many parents.
78. Id. at 30 (quoting one father as saying, “I liken the first three months after childbirth
as “the fourth trimester . . .”).
79. Amanda Perez & Sandy Peterson, Meeting the Needs of the Youngest Infants in Child Care,
29 ZERO TO THREE 13, 15–17 (2009) (arguing that during the fourth trimester very young
infants need a plan for responsive caregiving that incorporates the parents).
80. HARVEY KARP, THE HAPPIEST BABY ON THE BLOCK: THE NEW WAY TO CALM CRYING AND
HELP YOUR BABY SLEEP LONGER (2002).
81. Id. at 64–65.
82. E.g., RUBIN, supra note 19, at 105 (describing neonate as a transitional stage between
the uterus and the outside world).
83. NORTHRUP, supra note 58, at 121. Breastfeeding has even been characterized as a way
to extend the care and protection of the placenta in the outside world because it provides
numerous immunities, antibodies, and the crucial amount of touch and sucking new infants
need. Accord id. . at 123–24. In some contexts, however, the fetus has been classified as a baby.
See Nicole Isaacson, The “Fetus-Infant”: Changing Classifications of the “In Utero” Development in
Medical Texts, 11 Soc. Forum 457, 460 (1996) (examining how medical textbooks extend
childhood into the womb by collapsing the boundaries between fetuses and infants). See also
Katie Oliviero, Flaying Life and Law: Precarious Personhood in 21st Century Anti-Abortion
Campaign (unpublished manuscript).
84. KARP, supra note 80, at 63; 67–68.
85. Karp draws on uncited speculations from evolutionary psychology and essentializing
claims that “babies do not cry” in certain “primitive” ethnic clans. Underlying what many
claim is an effective paradigm for caring for fussy infants is a problematic foray into human
archeology and contemporary anthropology. Karp jumps from making claims about the prac-
tices of unspecified prehistoric ancestors, KARP, supra note 80, at 64, to providing infant care
tips gleaned from the !Kung San people of South Africa. Id. At 84–85.
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ARIA NO. 5
It’s been almost two months. My hunger for sleep has become starvation, a
deep primal ache that never abates. I wonder if it will ever end. The lochia
has finally stopped. I’m starting to feel anxious. Always the eager student, I
was happy when I passed my six-week check. But my cesarean scar is still
weeping. No infection, they tell me, just normal weeping. What is this? Nor-
mal weeping. I guess weeping is normal since I am awash in hormones, and
I cry easily.
I am overwhelmed and I long for a half hour away—I can drive now. I
take a wild trip to pick up a hospital grade pump at a local lactation center,
delighted by the silence.
With silence and space to think, I realize I’m probably in trouble. I have
no daycare lined up. I don’t know how I will leave Delilah. Colleagues who
have small babies discuss the necessity of nannies and nanny shares. Such
an option seems impossible on one income, away from our mothers, fathers,
and siblings. Most daycare centers have very few spots for infants under a
year old. I am ok for now—it is summer, and I am an academic. Maybe my
mother will come. Maybe my partner can stay home. But maybes don’t take
care of babies. I curse to myself. I have resources, a good job, and support.
What do people with less do?
ACT II: ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND PREGNANCY:
ON FOURTH TRIMESTER FAILURES
At the federal level, a variety of statutory schemes contain preg-
nancy-related law86 that may be impacted by the expansion of
pregnancy to include a fourth trimester; however, only some of this
law addresses the problems of pregnancy discrimination in the
workplace. Federal antidiscrimination protections are embodied in
four interrelated statutory schemes: Title VII, as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which defines sex discrimina-
tion to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth,
86. Some aspects of federal law provide social welfare benefits for pregnant individuals:
nutrition assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (2012) (providing a special supplemental nutrition
program for women, infants, and children); medical insurance, 42 U.S.C. § 1397ll (2012)
(authorizing “[o]ptional coverage of targeted low-income pregnant women through a State
plan amendment”); or cash assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (2008) (authorizing “block grants [to
states] for temporary assistance for needy families”). The tax code also facilitates the federal
law of pregnancy by allowing above-the-line deductions for dependents and itemized deduc-
tions for medical expenses. 26 U.S.C. § 213 (2012), or pre-tax deductions for dependent care
through employer programs. 26 U.S.C. § 21 (2012).
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and related medical conditions;87 the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), which provides some employees with twelve weeks of un-
paid leave for the birth of a child;88 the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), which addresses pregnancy discrimination through the
regulation of working conditions and hours;89 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 (ADAAA).90 This Article argues that the current legal regime
fails to adequately account for the fourth trimester in its scope of
protections, leaving large loopholes in antidiscrimination legisla-
tion that undermine the discrimination protections for pregnant
women and their families.
A. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA), expanding Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination
to include pregnancy discrimination. The PDA ensures that Title
VII sex discrimination protections include, “pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions;”91 however, the Act does not limit
the definition of sex discrimination in other areas.92 Congress
passed the PDA as a response not only to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in General Electric Company v. Gilbert93 but also to the lobbying of
a coalition of labor unions, feminist groups, and church groups.94
The PDA permits courts to find violations of Title VII when the
record shows that an employer treated similarly situated pregnant
87. Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (“An Act to amend Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy”).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2013).
89. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2013).
90. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (2008).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2008); Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198–99
(1991).
92. Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (“(k) The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the
basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title [42 USC 2000e-
2] shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.”)
93. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act overturned Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976) (holding that exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities was not in itself discrimi-
nation based on sex).
94. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S
L.J. 1, 8 (1985) (citing J. GELB & M. PALLEY, WOMEN AND PUBLIC POLICIES 159–60 (1982)).
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employees differently than similarly situated nonpregnant employ-
ees.95 Under current interpretations of the PDA, an employer is not
required to treat a pregnant employee better than similarly situated
employees, although he may not treat her worse for the purposes of
compensation, employment, and benefits.96 However, the Act does
not prohibit states from enacting remedial legislation to protect or
provide additional benefits to pregnant women.97
Congress intended the PDA to protect women in paid positions
against stereotypes about the capacities of women and their “place”
in society.98 While the Act’s prohibition against discrimination ex-
plicitly designates pregnancy, childbirth, and medical conditions
related to pregnancy and childbirth as sex-based characteristics,99
protections against pregnancy discrimination extend to both men
and women.100 Male plaintiffs may sue for negative employment ac-
tions taken against them because they are married to a pregnant
95. See, e.g., Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 363–64 (3rd Cir. 2008),
remand (stating that the PDA orders employers to treat pregnant employees the same as
non-pregnant employees who are similarly situated in their ability to work). For this reason,
some commentators claim that the PDA provides an effective shield that employers may use
to discriminate against pregnant employees. Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act: Legitimating Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REV. 225
(1998) (noting that the courts have interpreted the PDA to permit stereotype based discrimi-
nation). There is some disagreement about how to apply the comparator requirements of the
PDA and whether, in the wake of the amended ADA’s expansion of protections and accom-
modations for pregnancy as a temporary as a disability, employers are required to provide
reasonable accommodations to pregnant workers when they provide accommodations to
non-pregnant workers who are similarly situated in their ability or inability to work. Brief of
Law Professors and Women’s Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (2013) No. 12-1226, available at http://
sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/28146-pdf-Grossman.pdf. The Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari to Young v. United Parcel Services, Inc., to resolve this
question. 707 F.3d 437 (2013), cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 2898 (U.S. July 1, 2014) (No. 12-1226).
96. Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
97. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (affirming that California
state statute, CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12945 (West 2012), was not preempted by the PDA because
it did not mandate that employers place pregnant workers in a more advantageous position
over other disabled workers, but only established a base minimum of benefits to be provided
to pregnant employees).
98. Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). Courts have also acknowledged that the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act was designed to combat the stereotype that pregnant women
and women who become mothers belong in the home and that they are unable to participate
in the workforce. Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 740–41 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Ani-
mus towards pregnant women may be inferred based on these comments; specifically, a
belief that pregnancy disqualifies women from effectively participating in the workforce.”).
99. Wright, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42366, at *6.
100. Both men and women can also be subject to discrimination that places a “maternal
wall” between an individual and employment opportunities based upon caretaking roles.
Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segel, Beyond the Maternal Wall, 115 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 79
(2003).
138 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:1
woman.101 However, Title VII’s application limits the PDA’s scope
in some significant ways. It does not cover women who work in busi-
nesses with fewer than fifteen employees.102 Additionally, the PDA’s
protections do not require employers to treat pregnant employees
equally in all circumstances. For example, bona fide seniority sys-
tems that produce different benefit plans do not constitute sex
discrimination unless intent to discriminate exists, even if pregnant
and non-pregnant employees are treated differently.103
The PDA’s current provisions, as interpreted by the federal
courts, fail to respond adequately to the types of discrimination
women may face during the fourth trimester. Federal courts’ inter-
pretations of the PDA that do not provide protections for
breastfeeding, infant care, and post-pregnancy recovery exemplify
that failure.104 The PDA fails to account for the fourth trimester of
the pregnancy in three ways. First, when courts examine plaintiffs’
claims of pregnancy discrimination, they adopt a rigid conception
of formal equality by comparing the pregnant woman to a hypo-
thetical, allegedly similarly situated male.105 Second, courts applying
the PDA often require, in contravention of the EEOC’s guide-
lines,106 that women who seek the Act’s protection must be
completely capable of performing all aspects of their jobs107 Third,
when courts examine potential pregnancy discrimination claims,
they often limit the scope of their inquiry by defining pregnancy to
exclude the crucial fourth trimester. In particular, courts have
101. Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding that a husband
alleging that he was fired because he was married to a pregnant woman had standing to bring
an action claiming that he had been discriminated against in violation of Title VII).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2008).
103. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 709 (2009) (holding that an employer policy
enacted prior to the PDA that gave less retirement credit for personal leave for pregnancy
after six weeks than it gave for other types of medical leave did not violate the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act because it constituted a bona fide seniority system).
104. These interpretations of the PDA by the courts differ from the EEOC’s guidance,
which expressly provides protections under the statute for a variety of pregnancy related
discrimination including lactation discrimination and discrimination related to the intent to
become pregnant. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, NO. 915.003, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (July 14, 2014), available at http://www.eeoc
.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm (superseding Section 626: Pregnancy, EEOC
Compliance Manual, Volume II; Policy Guidance on the Supreme Court Decision in Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.) (1991)).
105. Carvey Manners, supra note 10 (drawing from EU law to argue that the requirement
for a comparator in the PDA should be eliminated).
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10; OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, supra note 104.
107. Grossman, supra note 11, at 609–11.
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failed to extend pregnancy discrimination protections to
breastfeeding, pregnancy-related incapacity, and infant care.108
1. Fourth Trimester Failures I: Breastfeeding and the PDA
Breastfeeding has come to occupy a complex, but important,
role in questions related to infant care, maternal health, and public
policy.109 Although the science surrounding breastfeeding is con-
tested,110 studies indicate that breastfeeding has significant
benefits.111 In light of this evidence, many state and federal govern-
ment offices have adopted a positive public policy to encourage
new mothers to breastfeed their infants for at least six months and
ideally a year.112 Before the passage of the Affordable Care Act,113
no federal or state statutes required employers to support women
who chose to breastfeed after they returned to work.114 Most states
have passed laws permitting women to breastfeed in public places115
108. Although the EEOC has provided guidelines that may alter the way in which federal
courts interpret the PDA, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, supra note 104, courts may not
follow this guidance. Infra 269.
109. Corey Silberstein Shdaimah, Why Breastfeeding Is (Also) a Legal Issue, 10 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 409 (1999).
110. RIORDAN & WAMBACH, supra note 42; see also infra note 111.
111. Some commentators, however, claim that the benefits of breastfeeding have been
oversold and that the benefits some studies indicated may actually result from a constellation
of complementary factors. See Linda C. Fentiman, Marketing Mothers’ Milk: The Commodification
of Breastfeeding and the New Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 NEV. L.J. 29, 45–49
(2009).
112. United States (42 U.S.C. § 1790 (2006)), California (CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 123366 (West 2014)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.5-102 (2013)), Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40w (2013)), D.C. (D.C. CODE § 2-1402.81 (2001)), Florida (FLA.
STAT. § 383.015 (2014)), Illinois (§ 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137/5 (2004)), Kansas (KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-1,248 (2013)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2247.1 and § 47:305.67 (ex-
empting breastfeeding items from sales and use taxes)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
19-501 (2012)), New York (N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2505-a (McKinney 2012)), Pennsylvania
(35 P.S. § 636.2), Puerto Rico (P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.1, § 5165 (2008)).
113. 29 U.S.C. 207(r) (2012).
114. Fentiman, supra note 111, at 58.
115. Alabama (CODE OF ALA. § 13A-12-130), Arkansas (A.C.A. § 20-27-2001), California
(CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.3 (WEST 2014)), D.C. (D.C. CODE § 2-1402.82 (2001)), Florida (FLA.
STAT. § 847.001 (2008)), Illinois (§ 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137/10 (2004)), Indiana (BURNS
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-35-6-1), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,248 (2013)), Louisiana (LA. REV.
STAT. 51:2247.1), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 221 (2014)), Michigan (MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 117.5h (2006)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-19-501 (2012)), New
York (N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2505-a (McKinney 2012)), Pennsylvania (35 P.S. § 636.4),
Puerto Rico (P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 3518 and P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 21, § 4567c (2005)),
Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-13.5-1 (2008)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-40
(2010)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-58-102 (2013)), Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9
§ 4502(j) (2006)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.215 (West 2008)), and Wis-
consin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West 2005)).
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as well as an array of other laws designed to take breastfeeding into
consideration.116 In a 1981 decision finding constitutional protec-
tions for breastfeeding,117 Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals described breastfeeding as “the most elemental form of
parental care. It is a communion between mother and child that,
like marriage, is ‘intimate to the degree of being sacred.’”118 Be-
cause it provides numerous immunities, antibodies, and the crucial
amount of touch and sucking new infants require, some have char-
acterized breastfeeding as an “extension of the placenta.”119 Courts
have permitted employers to discriminate under the PDA against
working women who take part in breastfeeding and breast milk
pumping because courts often do not regard milk expression or
lactation as part of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical con-
dition.120 Courts have interpreted pregnancy-related medical
conditions narrowly,121 implicitly permitting fourth trimester
discrimination.
In spite of evidence that Congress intended to include lactation
within the scope of the PDA in 1978,122 some federal courts have
placed discrimination because of lactation, breastfeeding, and milk
expression beyond the scope of the PDA. In most of these cases,123
116. Fentiman, supra note 111, at 61–62.
117. Dike v. Sch. Bd., 650 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. Unit B. July 1981) (applying strict scrutiny to
the government as an employer), overruled by Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir.
1997) (permitting the attorney general of Georgia to withdraw a job offer to a woman be-
cause she went through a marriage ceremony with another woman). Recent constitutional
decisions concerning intimate association for same sex couples may problematize Shahar,
requiring a more exacting form of scrutiny for government actions which discriminate
against gays and lesbians. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (the constitution pro-
tects a liberty interest for same sex conduct between consenting adults in the privacy of their
home); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating a provision of the
Defense of Marriage Act that limited the federal recognition of marriage only to heterosex-
ual couples).
118. Dike, 650 F.2d at 787 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
119. NORTHRUP, supra note 58, at 123–24.
120. See Falk v. City of Glendale, No. 12-cv-00925-JLK 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87278, at *10
(D. Colo. June 25, 2012) (“The language of the PDA focuses solely on the conditions exper-
ienced by the mother. While lactation is not per se excluded, Title VII does not extend to
breast-feeding as a child care concern.”).
121. E.g., id.
122. The Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2011, S. 1463, 112th Cong. (2011), would
amend Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include information about breastfeed-
ing. It would explicitly state that in passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978,
Congress intended to include breastfeeding and expressing milk as protected conduct.
123. But see EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding
that breastfeeding is a medical condition related to pregnancy for the purposes of the PDA);
Martin v. Canon Bus. Solutions, No. 11 C 2565-WJM-KMT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129008, at
*21 n.3 (D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2013) (finding that “accommodation of the need to express breast
milk readily fits into a reasonable definition of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); contra, Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co.,
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courts determined that the PDA does not prohibit discrimination
related to breastfeeding, expressing breast milk, and weaning.124
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in particular, narrowly inter-
preted the scope of the Act. The Court found that the
incapacitation and illness of pregnancy and related medical condi-
tions are not similar in kind to the limitations placed upon mothers
nursing infants.125 Although lactation may be associated with
women and pregnancy, some courts have failed to view breastfeed-
ing and lactation as medically related to pregnancy.126
A minority of courts, however, have begun to recognize what
many commentators argue:127 discrimination on the basis of
breastfeeding, milk expression, or lactation is pregnancy discrimi-
nation. For example, in EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that terminating a female em-
ployee because she is lactating or expressing milk constitutes
789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (”While it may be that breast-feeding and weaning are
natural concomitants of pregnancy and childbirth, they are not ‘medical conditions’ related
thereto.”), aff’d Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., No. 90-6259, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30157 (6th
Cir. 1991).
124. Puente v. Ridge, 324 F. App’x 423 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the PDA did not
require the employer to make the accommodation of extra-long breaks for breastfeeding
mother to pump milk); Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988) (determining em-
ployer’s denial of breast-feeding leave did not give rise to a disparate impact claim); Falk,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87278 (finding that employer who denied breastfeeding plaintiff pri-
vate space to express milk and breaks from work to do so did not violate the PDA because
Title VII does not prohibit lactation discrimination); Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d
305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding breastfeeding is not a protected status); Fejes v. Gilpin Ven-
tures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Colo. 1997) (“[B]reast-feeding and child rearing
concerns after pregnancy are not medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth
within the meaning of the PDA.”); Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (determining that although
breastfeeding is a uniquely female attribute, employer who denied employee unpaid leave to
breastfeed her infant did not engage in discrimination because of pregnancy and sex).
125. Barrash, 846 F.2d at 931–32. The Fourth Circuit’s failure to acknowledge the poten-
tial similarities between limitations placed upon mothers nursing young infants and those
individuals recovering from pregnancy because it regards breastfeeding as a purely volitional
act. The Court distinguished recovering pregnant persons from “young mothers wishing to
nurse little babies.” Id. at 932 (emphasis added). Clearly, the Court regards breastfeeding not
as an imperative aspect of childbirth and pregnancy but as a lifestyle choice.
126. For example, in Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 868, Judge Simpson of the United States
District Court of the Western District of Kentucky rejected a breastfeeding plaintiff’s claim
that an employer’s refusal to grant personal leave because the employee’s six week old infant
refused to wean or take a bottle constituted impermissible discrimination based upon preg-
nancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition.
127. E.g., Jendi B. Reiter, Accommodating Breastfeeding and Pregnancy in the Workplace: Beyond
the Civil Rights Paradigm, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1999) (arguing that an equality-based civil
rights model is inadequate to deal with pregnancy discrimination); Heather M. Kolinsky,
Respecting Working Mothers with Infant Children: The Need for Increased Federal Intervention to De-
velop, Protect, and Support a Breastfeeding Culture in the United States, 17 DUKE. J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 333 (2010) (arguing that federal legislation should consolidate the protections pro-
vided by private employers and states in order to recognize, value, and encourage
breastfeeding).
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impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII.128 Finding for the
EEOC, the Firth Circuit determined that negative employment ac-
tions on the basis of lactation or milk expression can give rise to an
actionable claim of sex discrimination under Title VII and that lac-
tation is a medical condition related to pregnancy for the purposes
of the PDA.129 Noting that the PDA does not define “medical condi-
tions” in its prohibition against discrimination for “pregnancy,
childbirth, and related medical conditions,” the Court focused on
the “plain meaning” of the words in the statute and reasoned that
this included any physiological condition.130 The Court stated that
“[i]t is undisputed in this appeal that lactation is a physiological
result of being pregnant and bearing a child.”131 As such, discrimi-
nation because of lactation, like discrimination because of
menstruation, would be included in the scope of the pregnancy dis-
crimination within the “reasonable definition of ‘pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.’”132 In spite of this deci-
sion, the PDA, as the majority of federal courts have interpreted it,
does not mandate special accommodations for pregnant employees
who are nursing.133
2. Fourth Trimester Failures II: Accommodations for
Pregnancy-Related Incapacity
One reason the PDA may not provide adequate antidiscrimina-
tion protection during the fourth trimester is that it does not
require employers to accommodate pregnant employees’ incapaci-
ties.134 The PDA does not require preferential treatment for
pregnant employees.135 While employers may provide additional
benefits or preferential treatment to pregnant employees,136 em-
ployers are not required to do so.137 For this reason, the PDA may not
protect many pregnant women from discrimination.138 Some com-
mentators have argued that the Americans with Disabilities Act’s
128. EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 428–30 (5th Cir. 2013).
129. Id. at 428–29.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 428.
132. Id. at 430.
133. Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998); see Houston Funding II,
Ltd.,717 F.3d at 430 (Jones, J., concurring).
134. Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994).
135. Id.
136. Cal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
137. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738; Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th
Cir. 1994).
138. Grossman, supra note 11, at 570.
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requirement that employers make “reasonable accommodations”
should be available to pregnant employees;139 remedies for discrim-
ination, however, are available only to employees who are able to
work at their full capacity.140 According to Judge Conway:
. . . [t]o the extent that a pregnant employee is able and will-
ing to work . . . the PDA protects her right to remain in the
workplace. The language of the statute simply does not ad-
dress the right of a pregnant employee, fully able to work, to
receive benefits that are different from, and arguably superior
to, the benefits available to other workers.141
In interpreting the PDA, the courts have adopted a comparator
model that makes it exceedingly difficult for pregnant women seek-
ing reasonable accommodations to receive relief. For the purposes
of the Act, employers may treat pregnant employees differently
than other employees if a similarly situated individual, even if only
hypothetical, would be treated in a similar fashion. The federal cir-
cuits have defined comparators in reference to similarly situated
male employees even though the PDA was passed to address the
unique challenges that women face because of their role in procre-
ation.142 Violations of the PDA can be found in cases where the
record has shown that similarly situated pregnant employees were
139. Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act,
53 B.C. L. REV. 443 (2012) (arguing that in the workplace women may experience the
healthy state of pregnancy as a disability); D’Andra Millsap, Comment, Reasonable Accommoda-
tion of Pregnancy in the Workplace: A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 32 HOUS.
L. REV. 1411 (1996) (arguing that due to the historical link between pregnancy and disability
Congress should amend the PDA to mirror the ADA’s requirement for reasonable accommo-
dation); Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Accommodating
Pregnancy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO L.J. 193 (1993) (arguing that the
pregnancy should be considered a disability under the ADA). The interaction between the
PDA and the Americans with Disabilities Act may have the potential to provide a foundation
for arguing that reasonable accommodations should be made for pregnant employees. Sa-
muel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 407 (2000)
(noting that the interaction between pregnancy and disability provides fertile ground for
further inquiry). Examining the overlap between the ADA and the PDA, some commentators
have argued that the law may require employers to make accommodations for pregnancy if
they provide accommodations for other employers who are similarly limited in their ability to
work. Widiss, supra note 13. Some commentators have argued that the explicit disaggregation
of the ADA from the PDA emerges from the wariness of feminists to embrace the ADA as a
tool for advancing the protection of pregnant workers. Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disabil-
ity, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis of the ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER
& SOC’Y 1 (2012) (arguing that it is time to expand the right to reasonable accommodations
under the ADA to pregnant employees).
140. Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1316.
141. Id.
142. See Carvey Manners, supra note 10, at 214–24.
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treated differently than comparators, i.e., similarly situated non-
pregnant employees who are generally men.143 However, if no
similarly situated workers are granted sick leave or light duty, then
an employer need not grant a hypothetical pregnant worker sick
leave or light duty.144 Courts apply this comparator approach by re-
quiring that women seeking the protections of the Act for absences
and illnesses related to pregnancy compare themselves to men who
are not pregnant.145 Even when employees are granted relief for
pregnancy discrimination under the Act, the point of reference
continues to be the male employee who is treated more favorably
than his similarly situated pregnant female counterpart.146 This
comparator-based analysis also applies to claims of discrimination
from pregnancy-related illnesses.147
Judge Posner’s decision in Troupe v. May Department Stores is the
classic example of this analysis.148 In Troupe,149 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals examined a case where an employer terminated a
department store employee, who was suffering from morning sick-
ness, before her maternity leave. Judge Posner noted that the PDA
does not require employers to provide maternity leave or to make
any other accommodations to ensure that pregnant women are able
to work.150 Accordingly, “[e]mployers can treat pregnant women as
badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees
143. See, e.g., Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating
that the PDA orders employers to treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant em-
ployees who are similarly situated in their ability to work).
144. See, e.g., Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distrib. Co., 356 F. Supp. 2d 964 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that showed she was treated
differently than the second group of employees who were injured off the job. The defendant
claimed that there was a change of policy as to reassignment to light duty for off the job
injury after September 2001 and provided employee testimony which supported their claim.
The court found that due to the plaintiff’s failure to show that the alleged policy change was
pretext to discriminate against her pregnancy-related status, it could not disturb the jury’s
verdict.
145. See Jirak v. Fed. Express Corp., 805 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that plain-
tiff produced evidence that the company’s policy of termination was applied differently to
males and females).
146. See Somers v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (finding
school district violated Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination when it required a
pregnant female employee to take mandatory unpaid leave or face termination while male
employees suffering from temporary physical disabilities were not required to take
mandatory, unpaid sick leave).
147. E.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1511–12 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that
“the implementation of a policy or practice under which pregnant employees were treated
differently from other temporarily-disabled employees with similar capacity for work would
still be a violation of both the letter and spirit of Title VII’s prohibition against pregnancy
discrimination.”).
148. Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
149. Id. at 735.
150. Id. at 737.
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. . .”151 Furthermore, the PDA does not protect employees from ad-
verse employer action because of morning sickness or pregnancy-
related illness, and “[i]f an employee who . . . does not have an
employment contract cannot work because of illness, nothing in Ti-
tle VII requires the employer to keep the employee on the
payroll.”152 The result of the comparator approach is that illness
arising from morning sickness, even when severe, may not be
treated as a related medical condition for the purposes of the Act,
so long as a similarly situated sickly Mr. Troupe (hypothetical or
not) would have been treated in a similar fashion.
Cases like Troupe have led some commentators to claim that the
law of sex discrimination for pregnant workers conforms to a capac-
ity-based model in its application.153 This model results in an
improperly narrow interpretation of the PDA.154 A capacity-based
interpretation of the PDA only protects a pregnant woman if she is
capable of performing the various duties of their job as if she were
not pregnant.155 As a result, employers can freely discriminate
against employees recovering from pregnancy, engaging in infant
care, or breastfeeding because these employees are required to
meet a standard that compares them to people who are not and
have not been pregnant. In light of this, commentators argue that
courts should read the Act to require that employers make some
reasonable accommodations for pregnant employees. Herma Hill
Kay, for example, has argued that for women to realize equal op-
portunity in employment, some accommodation or compensation
is necessary to address the different cultural and physiological roles
that women play in reproduction.156
151. Id. at 738.
152. Id. at 737. In order to recover for pregnancy discrimination a pregnant employee
like Troupe would have to show that if all the relevant facts were identical except for her
pregnancy, she would have been treated more favorably. Id. at 738. Effectively this would
mean that she would have to show that her tardiness was treated differently than the tardi-
ness of other similarly situated nonpregnant employees. Id. at 738–39. Numerous
commentators have criticized the opinion, noting that the Court’s requirements still adhere
to an ideal worker who is more likely to be male than not.
153. See Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE. J.L. & FEMINISM 15 (2009). Accord-
ing to Ruth Colker, these failures may arise from the reality that courts generally employ a
laissez-faire economic perspective in making determinations about the scope of antidis-
crimination protections for pregnant workers. Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Parenting, and
Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 61, 63–65 (1997).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Kay, supra note 94, at 22–28.
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3. Fourth Trimester Failures III: Infant Care
Courts have interpreted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act nar-
rowly so that its prohibitions against discrimination do not include
discrimination because of the need to care for young infants157 or
infants with special needs.158 The PDA does not require employers
to grant paid or unpaid leave to employees for recovery from preg-
nancy. So long as the employer has no policy for granting paid or
unpaid leave to similarly situated employees during their recovery
from illness or disability, pregnant women can be required to re-
turn to work quickly after giving birth. Courts have repeatedly
rejected claims against employers denying parental leave to individ-
uals caring for their young infants.159 For the purposes of Title VII
and the PDA, courts have repeatedly held that sex discrimination
does not prohibit an employer from refusing to grant parental
leave.160 Furthermore, when courts do grant relief, they insist that
the justification for this relief stems solely from a desire to support
the pregnant woman’s physical recovery alone without regard to
the important psychological and social aspects of the fourth tri-
mester.161 Such a perspective not only disregards the impor-
tance of bonding but also discounts the importance of this crucial
transition period for primary care-givers who have not given
birth, like fathers,162 non-gestational mothers, or adoptive
157. Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1491–93 (D. Colo. 1997) (stating
that the needs or conditions of a child requiring the mother’s presence are not within the
purview of the PDA) (citing Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990),
aff’d without opinion, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927
(4th Cir. 1988); Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442 (D. Md. 1994).
158. Fleming v. Ayers & Assocs., 948 F.2d 993, 997 (6th Cir. 1991).
159. See Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that a
childcare issue is not a sex-plus characteristic recognized by Title VII); Fejes, 960 F. Supp. at
1491–93 ; Barrash, 846 F.2d 927; Barnes, 846 F. Supp. 442; but see Roberts v. U.S. Postmaster
Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (recognizing that a disparate impact claim may be
possible in circumstances where women are forced to resign more often than men because
employers are denying them parental leave).
160. Barnes, 846 F. Supp. at 443 (finding denial of leave request in order to care for
infant’s medical problems is not gender based sex discrimination for the purposes of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Record v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. for the Deaf, 611
F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that the prohibition against sex discrimination
embodied in Title VII does not extend to protecting women wishing to take parental leave
for childrearing).
161. See Barnes, 846 F. Supp. at 444–45; see also Grossman & Thomas, supra note 153.
162. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 290–92 (1987) (noting that Title
VII permits women and men to be treated differently for the purposes of pregnancy leave
policies so long as the policies “cover only the period of actual physical disability on account of
pregnancy”); Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of the Sch. Dist. Of Pittsburgh, Pa., 903 F.2d 243,
248 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that year-long childrearing policy for women but not for men
without a showing of disability contravenes the purpose of Title VII); Matter of Chavkin v.
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parents.163 Even though there has been a persistent push in feminist
legal scholarship and pressure from government agencies to ex-
pand the scope of antidiscrimination to include discrimination
based on caretaking,164 courts interpret PDA to exclude the com-
pelling fourth trimester concerns of infants.165
Current interpretations of the PDA fail to prohibit pregnancy dis-
crimination during the fourth trimester in two interrelated ways.
First, the courts interpret the PDA in ways that do not require ex-
tending accommodations to women workers because of pregnancy.
Second, pregnancy jurisprudence adopts a narrow definition that
ends with the birth of the infant. It refuses to regard discrimination
because of breastfeeding or infant care, which are crucial aspects of
the fourth trimester. The PDA, however, is not the only statutory
scheme which fails to account for the fourth trimester. The next
section will shift the Article’s focus to address the fourth trimester
failures of the Family Medical Leave Act.
Santaella, 81 N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (characterizing disability as the main
reason for paid sick leave after pregnancy). While the Supreme Court continues to recognize
the roles that fathers play in their children’s lives for constitutional purposes, Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 626, 652 (1975) (noting that “a father, no less than a mother, has a
constitutionally protected right to the ‘companionship, care, custody, and management’ of
[his] children” (citation omitted)), the PDA is still interpreted narrowly to exclude the con-
cerns of infants, fathers and non-gestational caregivers. Falk v. City of Glendale, No. 12-cv-
00925-JLK, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87278, at *10 (D. Colo. June 25, 2012) (“The language of
the PDA focuses solely on the conditions experienced by the mother.”).
163. Some employers operate with a presumption that fathers are not the primary
caregivers of young children. Fleming v. Ayers & Assocs., 948 F.2d 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that employer’s decision to terminate employee because her new infant’s medical
conditions would create higher insurance costs is not connected to her gender or her preg-
nancy and not prohibited by Title VII); Knussman v. Maryland, 16 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606 (D.
Md. 1998) (in which plaintiff challenged a supervisor’s claim that “the “primary care giver”
was presumed to be the mother”).
164. Employees have increasingly been seeking relief from discrimination related to care-
taking responsibilities and family obligations. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The
Jack Pemberton Lecture Series: Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing Trend of Family Responsibili-
ties Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171 (2006) (examining the “rapidly expanding” field of
family responsibility discrimination). There are some circumstances under which EEOC re-
gards discrimination against caretakers as unlawful under Title VII, particularly when such
discrimination is based on stereotypes or impacts male workers. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,
EEOC, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS
WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES, (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/caregiving.html. In spite of these interpretative guidelines, such discrimination against
caregivers seems to persist in the workplace. Press Release, EEOC, Unlawful Discrimination
Based on Pregnancy and Caregiving Responsibilities Widespread Problem, Panelists Tell
EEOC (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-15-
12.cfm; Written Testimony of Joan C. Williams, EEOC (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/williams.cfm.
165. Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Colo. 1997) (determining
“the PDA only provides protection based on the condition of the mother—not the condition
of the child”).
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B. The Family Medical Leave Act
In 1993, Congress passed the Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”)166 to address the universal vulnerabilities that arise from
care-giving and illness. While the PDA does not explicitly require
employers to provide maternity leave or sick leave for recovery from
pregnancy, the FMLA provides twelve weeks of legally protected
leave while an employee cares for his or her family.167 The Act pro-
vides that employees may take:
reasonable unpaid leave for medical reasons, for the birth or
adoption of a child, for the care of a child, spouse, or parent
who has a serious health condition, for the care of a covered
service member with a serious injury or illness, or because of a
qualifying exigency arising out of the fact that the employee’s
spouse, son, daughter, or parent is a military member on cov-
ered active duty. . .168
Although the FMLA allows for some women to have access to
unpaid leave after giving birth, it does not adequately account for
the demands of the fourth trimester. This failure stems in part from
the FMLA’s attempts to balance the interests of employees and em-
ployers.169 Before its passage, many regarded the FMLA as a
“modest” and “moderate” exercise of federal protection designed
to balance the interests of employees and employers through un-
paid family leave.170 In an effort to “balance the needs of the
workplace with the needs of families” and to “address the demands
and needs of the workforce,”171 the FMLA provides only low cost
unpaid leave and makes provisions for protecting the interests of
businesses regarding scheduling, administration, absenteeism, and
retention.172
The FMLA does not provide maternity leave to a large number of
women workers. According to a 2012 Department of Labor report,
166. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2013).
167. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2013).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101(a) (2013).
169. Shay Ellen Zeemer, Note, FMLA Notice Requirements and the Chevron Test: Maintaining
a Hard-Fought Balance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 261, 278 (2002).
170. E.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Chil-
dren, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism. of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 102d Cong. 22–24
(1991) (statement of Lawrence Perlman, President and Chief Executive Officer, Control
Data).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2012).
172. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Children,
Family, Drugs and Alcoholism. of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 102d Cong. 34–36
(1991) (statement of Sen. Claiborne Pell, Member, S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res.).
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only seventeen percent of job sites qualify for FMLA, and within
those qualifying sites, only fifty-nine percent of workers are eligible
for FMLA leave.173 The Department of Labor also reported that
FMLA does not cover eighty-nine percent of all employers,174 and
80.3% of non-covered worksites have fewer than ten employees.175
To be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must be employed
by an employer that has at least fifty employees on site176 or has at
least fifty employees within seventy-five miles of the site.177 Covered
workers must be employed for twelve months before FMLA leave
becomes available.178 During that time, the employee must work at
least 1250 hours.179 These requirements prevent many employees
from taking advantage of the FMLA.180 New employees, part-time
employees, and employees that work in “high turn-over fields” are
generally not eligible for FMLA leave.181 As a matter of percentage,
a larger share of women than men engage in part-time work,182
often to meet both their caretaker responsibilities at home and the
demands of an economy that increasingly requires more than one
income to make ends meet.183 In the current economic climate, the
number of workers who would prefer full-time work, but have been
173. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE IN 2012: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
(2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/FMLA-2012-Executive-Sum
mary.pdf.
174. The 2000 Survey Report: Impact of Family and Medical Leave on Non-Covered Establish-
ments, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/chapter7
.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
175. Id.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2012) (defining an eligible employer as “any person en-
gaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or
more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the
current or preceding calendar year”).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (excluding an employee who “is employed at a
worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of em-
ployees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50.”).
178. 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (2013).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (requiring eligible employees to have “at least
1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period.”).
180. Megan E. Blomquist, A Shield, Not A Sword: Involuntary Leave Under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 76 WASH. L. REV. 509 (2001).
181. Kari Palazzari, The Daddy Double-Bind: How the Family and Medical Leave Act Perpetuates
Sex Inequality Across All Class Levels 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 429, 454 (2007).
182. Persons at Work in Nonagricultural Industries by Age, Sex, Race, Hispanic or Latino Ethnic-
ity, Marital Status, and Usual Full- or Part-Time Status, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, available at http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea27.pdf (last visited Aug. 28,
2014).
183. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-
CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2004).
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forced to work part-time on an involuntary basis, is currently on the
rise.184
Employees who work in a small business or as part of a widely
distributed workforce, which sometimes happens in rural regions of
the United States, are not eligible to take FMLA leave.185 The Act’s
failure to cover employees in small businesses186 and part time em-
ployees187 has been highlighted by scholars who are critical of the
act.188 Members of the House of Representatives attempted to allevi-
ate some of the FMLA’s omissions with two unsuccessful pieces of
legislation: the Family Medical Leave Enhancement Act of 2009,189
which would have extended FMLA coverage to employees at busi-
nesses with at least twenty-five employees, and the Family Fairness
Act of 2009, which would have extended FMLA coverage to part-
time employees.190
Workers covered by the FMLA may still be unable to take their
crucial fourth trimester leave. Although the Act allows twelve weeks
of leave, it is unpaid. The FMLA specifically fails to acknowledge
the economic vulnerabilities that might make taking unpaid leave
impossible for some employees. Many workers, particularly in the
current economy, cannot afford to take unpaid leave for any
amount of time, let alone twelve weeks. While some states have
moved toward requiring employers to provide paid family leave,191
184. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Involuntary Part-time Work on the Rise,
ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS (2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils71
.pdf.
185. Palazzari, supra note 181, at 454.
186. 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a)(3) (2013).
187. Id. § 825.110(a)(2).
188. Jessica Monroe, Note, Ohio’s “Pregnancy-Blind” Leave Policy: The Public Policy Ramifica-
tions of Mcfee v. Nursing Care Management of America, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 229, 234 (2011).
189. H.R. 824, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
111/hr824/text (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
190. See H.R. 389, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/111/hr389/text (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
191. Some of the states have offered more financially responsive forms of paid family
leave. In 2002, building on the state’s robust disability insurance scheme, California became
the first state to enact paid family leave. California provides up to twelve weeks of paid leave
to employees who request leave due to “the birth of a child of the employee, the placement
of a child with an employee in connection with the adoption or foster care of the child by the
employee, or the serious health condition of a child of the employee.” CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 12945.2(c)(3)(A) (West 2012). The state of Washington joined California in 2007, offering
a less expansive paid family leave program. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.86.020 (West 2008).
New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts currently have paid family leave bills pending. As-
semb. Bill No. 430, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014) (proposed bill); Assemb. Bill No. 6289,
234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (proposed bill); H.R. 79, 188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013)
(proposed bill). Minnesota and New Mexico offer some paid leave to low income working
parents through their providing grants and subsidies to low income parents who wish to live
at home with infant children. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 119B.21 (West 2008); H.R. 198, 50th Leg.,
2d Sess. (N.M. 2012).
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most states lack robust paid parental leave policies. In 2001, the
Department of Labor found that eighty-eight percent of persons
eligible for family leave under the FMLA do not take the full
amount of time off from work because they cannot afford it.192
Lower- and middle-income workers are less likely to take the
leave.193 The fact that this leave is unpaid hits these workers espe-
cially hard because their positions often lack paid sick leave and
vacation time that they could use to substitute for unpaid leave.194
This lack in the FMLA reinscribes socioeconomic class-based
marginalization in ways that exacerbate the vulnerabilities of the
fourth trimester. As the economic costs of giving birth195 and rais-
ing an infant196 increase, the possibility that workers may be able to
enjoy a fourth trimester period without a significant drop in their
income decreases.
The FMLA also reinscribes identity-based inequalities for families
that fail to fit the normative ideal of two married, heterosexual par-
ents. Unpaid leave fails to take into account the vulnerabilities of
single-parent families that often lack sufficient savings to support an
192. Jennifer Thompson, Family and Medical Leave for the 21st Century?: A First Glance at
California’s Paid Family Leave Legislation, 12 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 77, 86 (2004).
193. Palazzari, supra note 181, at 460.
194. Id.
195. The current cost of prenatal care and delivery in the United States has become im-
possible for most families to pay for without some form of health insurance. The total
charges for a vaginal delivery and a cesarean delivery were $32,093 and $51,125 respectively
in 2010. TRUVEN HEALTH ANALYTICS, THE COSTS OF HAVING A BABY IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXECUTIVE STUDY (2013), available at http://transform.childbirthconnection.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2013/01/Cost-of-Having-a-Baby-Executive-Summary.pdf. Even though women
in the United States are discharged from the hospital quickly in comparison to their Euro-
pean counterparts and receive similar services, they pay significantly more for prenatal care
and childbirth. Elisabeth Rosenthal, American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/health/american-way-of-birth-costli
est-in-the-world.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. And in comparison to other global north OECD
nations, the United States has high rates of infant mortality, see Recent Trends in Infant Mortal-
ity in the United States, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, (Oct. 2008), http://www
.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db09.htm, and maternal death, see Country Comparisons, Ma-
ternal Mortality Rate, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2223rank.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
These high costs do not include the price many families pay for reproductive technology
assistance. See, e.g., DEBORAH SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006) (discussing the rising costs of in vitro and surro-
gacy); Rebecca B. Russell et al., Cost of Hospitalization for Preterm and Low Birth Weight Infants in
the United States, 120 PEDIATRICS NO. 1 (July 1, 2007) (discussing the rising costs associated
with preterm and low birth weight infants); Elizabeth L. Shearer, Cesarean Section: Medical
Benefits and Costs, 37 SOC. SCI. MED. 1223 (1993) (discussing the rising costs associated with
unnecessary cesarean sections).
196. Press Release, USDA, Parents Projected to Spend $241,080 to Raise a Child Born in
2012, According to USDA Report (August 15, 2013), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/
portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2013/08/0160.xml.
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extended period of unpaid leave.197 While United States v. Windsor198
expanded the scope of the FMLA to include married gay and les-
bian persons,199 employees in unmarried partnerships and non-
traditional plural relationships may be excluded, as the Act pro-
vides leave only to care for “spouses” and children.200
The neutral, seemingly universal nature of the leave, which in-
cludes addressing the needs vulnerabilities of families, also
entrenches traditional gender-based care norms. While the statute’s
language is gender neutral and Congress passed it to help women
and men, women are far more likely to take their leave for care
responsibilities than men. Although only thirteen percent of the
FMLA leave was taken for childbirth or childcare, fifty-eight percent
of those taking leave were women.201 Men were more likely to use
their leave for their own qualifying illnesses than for family caretak-
ing responsibilities.202 This is likely related to the socialized
understanding and belief that only women experience pregnancy
and its related medical conditions. In actuality, pregnancy is a med-
ical condition that both the pregnant woman and her partner
experience as the responsibilities of childcare—particularly after
birth: supervising, changing diapers, and feeding—are ideally
shared. Men generally experience the social devaluation of their
contribution during their partner’s pregnancy and later may be lim-
ited in providing the care needed during the fourth trimester due
to social expectations and inflexible employment leave policies.
The legal protections for pregnancy in antidiscrimination law do
not adequately support the fourth trimester for the majority of
women. The FMLA is only a viable fourth trimester alternative for
mothers and fathers who are full-time workers with a significant de-
gree of attachment to the labor market, who work for larger
197. The legal landscape for single mothers, including changes to the bankruptcy code
and the elimination of Aid to Dependent Families with children, have made it difficult for
single mothers to raise their families and save for retirement. Pamela Gershuny, The Combined
Impact of the PRWORA, FMLA, IRC, FRD, DPPA, And BAPCPA on Single Mothers and their Chil-
dren, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 475, 476 (2012).
198. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
199. Guidance to Employee Benefit Plans on the Definition of “Spouse” and “Marriage” under
ERISA and the Supreme Court’s Decision in United States v. Windsor, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept.
18, 2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/tr13-04.html.
200. To conform to the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), the Department of Labor has issued notice that it would look to state law of the
jurisdiction where the couple married in its interpretation of the term “spouse.” This change,
which adopts a “place of celebration” rule, ensures that legally married same-sex couples now
“have consistent FMLA rights regardless of where they live.” The Family Medical Leave Act,
79 Fed. Reg. 36,445, 36,448 (proposed June 27, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).
201. Palazzari, supra note 181, at 456.
202. Id. at 457.
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companies, and who can also afford to take twelve weeks of unpaid
leave. Although there is empirical evidence that family leave cover-
age has a positive impact on keeping women in the workforce even
after they give birth,203 federal and state laws in the United States
provide only limited access to this much-needed leave for most em-
ployees. While the FMLA provides up to twelve weeks of unpaid
leave for women who have given birth,204 most individuals cannot
afford to forgo wages for three months.205 Even though some states
have required that women who have given birth receive some paid
leave, employees receive only a certain percentage of their typical
earnings.206 Most employers provide no paid maternity leave.207
Some firms that do provide paid maternity provide only four to six
weeks of leave,208 which covers only half of the intense period of the
fourth trimester. Even employers with the most generous leave poli-
cies in the United States, which provide up to nine months of paid
maternity leave,209 fail to approximate the amount of paid leave
provided to working women who give birth in most other global
203. MASAHIRO ABE ET AL., MATERNITY LEAVE POLICIES AND WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT AFTER
CHILDBIRTH: EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND JAPAN (1998), available at
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/Paper3.pdf. Some scholars have even found that ma-
ternity leave led to some positive health outcomes for infants. Maya Rosin, The Effects of
Maternity Leave on Children’s Birth and Infant Health Outcomes in the United States, 30 J. HEALTH
ECON. 221 (2011).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (2013).
205. This reality of unpaid leave will tend to reinforce marginalization and inequalities
across the labor market and across identity positions. Because recent immigrants, women,
and people of color have always populated a more contingent place in the labor market (i.e.
often named part of the precariat). The precariat encompasses those individuals who lack
stable occupational identities, existing in spaces of economic vulnerability characterized by
short-term work, unstable social welfare protections, and limited access to legal protections.
See generally GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (Bloomsbury Aca-
demic, 2011). For this reason, women of color, recent immigrants, and poor women, for
example, will be disproportionately impacted when policies lack fourth trimester protections
and payment. Starting from recognition that the fourth trimester is a period of dependency
stemming from a universal embodied need, necessarily requires more robust coverage to be
paid. It also requires that we provide the means for individuals to be uncoupled from work
and the logic of productivism during this period.
206. California (CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301 (West 2014); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN.
§3 4:11B-4 (West 2011)), New York, Rhode Island, Hawaii
207. Only twelve percent of workers have some access to paid family leave. U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENE-
FITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2012 108 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/
benefits/2012/ebbl0050.pdf; see also Cynthia L. Remmers, Pregnancy Discrimination and Paren-
tal Leave, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 377 (1989).
208. Maureen E. Lally-Green, The Implications of Inadequate Maternity Leave Policies Under
Title VII, 16 VT. L. REV. 223, 232 (1991).
209. 100 Best Companies 2013, WORKING MOTHER, available at http://www.workingmother
.com/best-company-list/146788 (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
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north industrial nations.210 For this reason, a significant number of
women who have given birth return to work within days or weeks of
giving birth—long before the fourth trimester and its demands
end.211 When women do choose to take the full amount of parental
leave available to them after giving birth, they not only forgo much
needed income but also suffer negative consequences in terms of
career advancement or perceptions that they are not committed to
the workplace.212
C. Fair Labor Standards Act
To a limited extent, antidiscrimination-like fourth trimester pro-
tections have seeped into other areas through laws and policies. For
example, breastfeeding mothers have gained increased protections
at the federal213 and state level.214 The Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), which regulates workplace conditions,215 provides only the
most minimal protections for working women during the fourth tri-
mester. The FLSA, through its regulations, omissions, and
permissions, has shaped the divide between family and market
210. Tara Siegel Bernard, In Paid Family Leave, U.S. Trails Most of the Globe, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/your-money/us-trails-much-of-the-
world-in-providing-paid-family-leave.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
211. Lally-Green, supra note 208, at 232.
212. Id. at 232–33.
213. In some ways, the federal government has adopted a pro-breastfeeding stance. E.g.,
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., THE SURGEON GEN-
ERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO SUPPORT BREASTFEEDING (2011), available at http://www
.surgeongeneral.gov/library/calls/breastfeeding/calltoactiontosupportbreastfeeding.pdf
(calling for education, medical care, community support and paid leave to support
breastfeeding). Breastfeeding mothers received some measure of protection when the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to require
that employers make provisions to support breastfeeding mothers at work. Section 7(r) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act – Break Time for Nursing Mothers Provision, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE
& HOUR DIV., http://www.dol.gov/whd/nursingmothers/Sec7rFLSA_btnm.htm (last visited
Aug. 28, 2014). It amends Section 7 of the FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 207) to require that employers provide reasonable break time for mothers expres-
sing milk for one year after the child’s birth and a place shielded from view and intrusion to
express milk that is not a bathroom. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(B) (2012). These law and
policy changes correlate with an increasing number of mothers starting to breastfeed in the
hospital and continuing to breast feed until six months. According to data gathered by the
CDC, seventy-seven percent of women who give birth now begin breastfeeding in the hospital
and forty-nine percent continue to breastfeed for six months. NAT’L CTR FOR CHRONIC DIS-
EASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, BREASTFEEDING REPORT CARD 2 (2013), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/pdf/2013BreastfeedingReportCard.pdf.
214. Breastfeeding Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (June 11, 2014), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/breastfeeding-state-laws.aspx#State.
215. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
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work.216 In 2010, Congress amended FLSA with provisions in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).217 The ACA
amendments to the FLSA require employers to support nursing
mothers in the workplace.218 For one year after the birth of a child,
an employer must provide reasonable break time for nursing em-
ployees219 and a private place, other than a bathroom, to pump
breast milk.220 Many employers would avoid this requirement, how-
ever, through the limited exemption for employers with fewer than
fifty employees.221 These employers are not required to provide
breaks or private places to nurse if doing so would, “impose undue
hardship by causing the employer significant difficulty or expense
when considered in relation to the size, financial resources, nature,
or structure of the employer’s business.”222 Employers are also not
required to pay employees during the breaks they take to pump.223
Forcing women to choose between breastfeeding their infants
and paid employment can cause hardship during the fourth trimes-
ter.224 Because of the workplace’s rigid demands, many mothers
wean their infants before they would like to and long before the
American Pediatric Society recommends doing so.225 While employ-
ees may receive some protections and reasonable accommodations
for breastfeeding from the FLSA’s provisions protecting the expres-
sion of milk, it is not clear that employers are complying.226 Some
courts have determined that there may not be mechanisms to en-
force the FLSA’s breastfeeding provisions.227 Legal relief might be
limited to petitioning the Department of Labor for an injunction.228
216. Arianne Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation: Decent Work and Decent
Families, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 119, 150 (2012) (arguing that the history of the FLSA
provides a vision of work and family).
217. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
218. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (2012).
219. § 207(r)(1)(A).
220. § 207(r)(1)(B).
221. § 207(r)(3).
222. Id.
223. § 207(r)(2).
224. Gabriela Steier, Womenomics for Nursing Growth: Making the Case for Work Time Flexibility
and Mother-Friendlier Workplaces, 21 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 119, 126–28 (2012) (argu-
ing for more workplace flexibility in order to support breastfeeding).
225. Id. at 127–28.
226. See Falk v. City of Glendale, No. 12-cv-00925-JLK, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87278, at *15
n.8 (D. Colo. June 25, 2012) (noting that FLSA requires that employer make accommoda-
tions for employee to express milk).
227. Salz v. Casey’s Mktg. Co., No. 11-CV-3055-DEO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100399, at *7
(N.D. Iowa July 19, 2012).
228. Id.
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Furthermore, vigorous disputes over the reasonableness of accom-
modations and break times may come to mirror the pattern of
current employer resistance to providing reasonable accommoda-
tions to disabled employees under the ADA.
Embracing a fourth trimester framework would also augment the
pro-breastfeeding policies embodied in the FLSA by making
breastfeeding part of a pregnancy continuum that lacks a clear
starting or ending point. When employers discriminate against
women because they are expressing milk or breastfeeding, it is
pregnancy discrimination because breastfeeding is often part of the
unwinding process of pregnancy.
D. Amended Americans with Disabilities Act
For pregnant workers, the Amended Americans with Disabilities
Act229 may provide some protection for the fourth trimester by pro-
tecting employees experiencing temporary physical limitations
arising from pregnancy. The product of a sophisticated coalition of
individuals from the disability rights movement,230 Congress passed
the ADA to eliminate discrimination against people with disabili-
ties. This was achieved by providing comprehensive federal
intervention and clear enforcement standards.231 Although the
ADA was not the first legislative effort to provide legal protections
against discrimination for people with disabilities, the Act was de-
signed to provide “uniform, national protections” that previous
efforts did not achieve.232 The ADA includes broad protections for
those that have a “disability.”233 This includes individuals who have,
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
229. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2008).
230. Chai Rachel Feldblum, The Art of Legislative Lawyering and the Six Circles Theory of Advo-
cacy, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 785 (2003) (using author’s experience working on the ADA to
illustrate the principles of what she terms “legislative lawyering”).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(b) (2008).
232. Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C. L. & C. R. 187,
188 (2008).
233. The classification of who “counts” as disabled for the purposes of the ADA is often
the central issue for plaintiffs seeking the protections of the act. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition
of a Disability Under the Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can we
Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 134–39 (2000). Limitations on who counts as
disabled have led to what Bradley Areheart has called a “Goldilocks dilemma”—in which a
person’s disability has to fit the court’s notion of “just right” in order to qualify for the pro-
tections of the ADA. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of
the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 181 (2008). As such,
many physical and mental impairments that substantially limit major life activities were ex-
cluded from the protections of the ADA before its 2008 Amendment. Feldblum et al., supra
note 232, at 192–95.
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or more major life activities. . . (B) a record of such an impair-
ment[,] or (C) [are] regarded as having such an impairment.”234
The ADA provides protections against discrimination for disabled
persons in three separate areas: private employment;235 government
provided benefits, services, programs, and activities;236 and places of
“public accommodation.”237
The ADA’s protections against employment discrimination mir-
ror those provided by Title VII in many ways. It provides that
employers covered by the Act cannot “discriminate against a quali-
fied individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.”238 Although the ADA’s employment
discrimination protections follow the model of Title VII’s prohibi-
tion against discrimination because of race, sex, or national
origin,239 they provide additional protections for disabled employ-
ees that go beyond the scope of Title VII. This aspect of the ADA
fundamentally changed the meaning and scope of discrimination
by providing disabled people with the right to ask employers for
differential treatment to accommodate their disabilities.240 For the
purposes of the ADA, “qualified individuals” with a disability in-
clude not only those who can perform all of the functions of the
job, but also those who can perform the “essential functions” of the
job but require some reasonable accommodation to do so.241
234. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2008).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2008).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2008).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2008).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2008).
239. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Ac-
commodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1996).
240. Id. at 2–3.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2008) (defining “qualified individual” as “an individual who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em-
ployment position that such individual holds or desires”). The ADA provides significant
protection for employers. The statute provides that an employer need not make reasonable
accommodations for its employees if the employer “can demonstrate that the accommoda-
tion would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2008). This means that, in some circumstances, employ-
ers are required to alter the job to meet the abilities of the disabled worker. Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 239, at 9. The Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the ADA,
ruling consistently against plaintiffs. Samuel R. Bagenstos, US Airways v. Barnett and the Limits
of Disability Accommodation, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES (Myriam Gilles & Risa Goluboff eds.
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953759 (discussing
the “Disabilities Act Term” in which the Supreme Court ruled against plaintiffs in four ADA
cases). Federal courts have also been increasingly resistant to the expansion of reasonable
accommodations for disabled individuals. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON
OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 173–75 (2007). Some commentators have even argued that the ADA seems
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Before 2008, courts refused to recognize pregnancy as a disabil-
ity. Because pregnancy was regarded as a healthy state, neither the
Supreme Court,242 nor the EEOC243 interpreted the ADA to require
employers to make reasonable accommodations for women who
faced substantial physical limitations and disabilities during their
pregnancies. Courts determined that pregnancy is not a disability
because it reflects the healthy functioning of the reproductive sys-
tem and not a physiological disorder.244 However, other courts have
included pregnancy-related impairments under the protections of
the ADA when the pregnancy creates unusual or atypical limitations
or impairments.245 To many, this is unsurprising. Although the ADA
has inspired many feminists to argue that pregnancy should receive
reasonable accommodations in the workplace,246 feminist commen-
tators have hesitated to base pregnancy accommodations in a
disability context.247
In response to the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the
ADA,248 which made it increasingly difficult for people with a wide
to “grant one class of employees a right to seek exemption from the general rules that their
fellow workers must follow.” Id. Many believe that this is the reason the ADA has triggered a
backlash in the courts and in public opinion. See Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try this Again: The
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the “Regard As” Prong of the Statutory Defini-
tion of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993 (2010) (noting that the uptick in the number of
employment discrimination cases might have led to a backlash).
242. The Supreme Court left open the possibility that pregnancy could be a disability in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976). However, for purposes of the ADA, many
courts have determined that it does not constitute a disability. See, e.g., Villarreal v. J.E. Merit
Constructors 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (1995) (citing EEOC guidance to determine that preg-
nancy is not a disability for the purposes of the ADA).
243. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: DISABILITY
RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) (July 27, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/gui
dance-inquiries.html (“Pregnancy is not a disability for purposes of the ADA. 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (1998).”).
244. Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D. Conn. 1997) (“Pregnancy
and related medical conditions have been held not to be physical impairments.”); see also
Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465 (D. Kan. 1996); Byerly v. Herr
Foods, No. CIV. A. 92-7382, 1993 WL 101196, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 1993).
245. Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Jessie v. Carter
Health Care Ctr., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 613, 616 (E.D. Ky. 1996); Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Construc-
tors, Inc. 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
246. See, e.g., Alemzadeh, supra note 139 (arguing that pregnancy discrimination should
be prohibited by the ADA because pregnancy substantially limits major life activities).
247. See Wendy Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
ment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 329–33 (1984); but see Cox, supra note 139,
at 449 (challenging “the prevailing assumption that characterizing pregnancy as a ‘disability’
for ADA purposes is inappropriate, unwise, and harmful to women” as incompatible with a
social model of disability).
248. See Befort, supra note 241, at 1013 (noting that the ADAAA “explicitly disavows” the
narrow Supreme Court interpretation of the ADA). As Jill C. Anderson notes, commentators
heavily criticized the post-1990 interpretations of the ADA. She notes that disability rights
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array of physical and mental impairments to obtain protections
under the Act,249 Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 (ADAAA).250 These amendments were designed to expand the
definition of disability and ensure that the Act protects more indi-
viduals.251 The 2008 ADA Amendments Act provides that
pregnancy-related impairments may be defined as disabilities.252 Ac-
cording to the EEOC’s interpretation of the Amended ADA,
workers who are temporarily disabled by pregnancy must be treated
like other temporarily disabled workers for the purposes of accom-
modations.253 If an employer accommodates temporarily disabled
employees who are not pregnant, perhaps with light duty, unpaid
leave, temporary reassignments, or disability leave, it must provide
advocates and commentators regard the pre-ADAAA jurisprudence of the ADA as “[a]bsurd],
bizarre, [and] counterintuitive.” Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992, 994 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (applying a formal linguistics lens to the statutory interpretation of the ADA).
249. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the Sutton trilogy, Sutton v. United Airlines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999), and Albert-
son’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), limited the definition of disability by
determining that mitigating treatments should be taken into consideration in defining
whether or not a person is disabled for the purposes of the ADA. EMILY A. BENFER, THE ADA
AMENDMENTS ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CHANGES TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341414. In
some circumstances, this means that individuals who were substantially limited in a major life
activity, yet had access to mitigating treatments, might not be protected as persons with disa-
bilities under the act. For example, some commentators have noted that it became
increasingly “difficult for people with epilepsy, diabetes, psychiatric disabilities, multiple scle-
rosis, muscular dystrophy, arthritis, hypertension, and other disabilities to prevail in court.”
Feldblum et al., supra note 232, at 193.
250. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
251. Id. § 2.
252. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 1630.2(h) (2014) (defining disability such that “a pregnancy-
related impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is a disability under the first
prong of the definition. Alternatively, a pregnancy-related impairment may constitute a ‘re-
cord of’ a substantially limiting impairment, or may be covered under the ‘regarded as’
prong if it is the basis for a prohibited employment action and is not ‘transitory and
minor.’”).
253. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (“Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions, for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the same as disa-
bilities caused or contributed to by other medical conditions, under any health or disability
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment.”); EEOC, Enforce-
ment Guidance: Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (July 14, 2014), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm. On July 1, 2014, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Young v. United Parcel Service in order to determine
whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires an employer to provide reasonable ac-
commodations for pregnant employees who are limited in their ability to work if it provides
reasonable accommodations to other temporarily disabled employees who are similarly lim-
ited in their ability to work. 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, U.S., No. 12-1226 (July
1, 2014); see also Brief of Law Professors and Women’s Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (2013) No. 12-1226,
available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/28146-pdf-Gross
man.pdf.
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access to similar accommodations for employees who are tempora-
rily disabled by pregnancy.254
The ADA as amended by the 2008 Act might provide some addi-
tional protections to pregnant women in the workplace.255 First,
although there is some controversy concerning the expansion of
temporary disability to cover pregnancy, pregnant women may be
able to access the protections of the ADA as amended by the 2008
Act more readily than before.256 Second, the ADAAA amended the
definition of disability to include a broad array of conditions, in-
cluding those arising from temporary disability, within the scope of
the Act’s protections.257 Furthermore, the ADA as expanded in-
cluded a list of major life activities; among that list are “certain
bodily functions” including “reproductive functions.”258 These
changes however, may provide only the elusive illusion of protec-
tion without having a practical impact on the ground. The potential
protection for pregnant employees in the Amended Americans with
Disabilities Act has not yet materialized. In spite of Congressional
efforts to expand the protections provided by the ADA through the
2008 Amendments,259 this expansion has had a limited impact for
women seeking protection against pregnancy discrimination. Even
if they do succeed, such protections may not be broad enough to
provide robust support for the fourth trimester. While these
changes in the ADA may seem promising, it is not clear that they
will provide protection to women whose pregnancy is characterized
by “normal” limitations. Furthermore, it is not clear that the expan-
sion of reasonable accommodations to pregnant workers under the
ADA will include the physiological, emotional, psychological, social,
and relational limitations arising from the challenges of the fourth
trimester.
254. Pregnancy Discrimination, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/pregnancy.cfm
(last visited April 29, 2014).
255. Joan C. Williams, Robin Devaux, Danielle Fuschetti & Carolyn Salmon, A Sip of Cool
Water: Pregnancy Accommodation after the ADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97
(2013) (arguing that the changes wrought by the ADAAA will ensure that women are entitled
to more accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions under federal law).
256. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 1630.2(h) (2014) (noting that while pregnancy is not an
impairment, conditions arising from pregnancy that substantially limit major life activities
and create a pregnancy-related impairment are disabilities).
257. Cox, supra note 139, at 444–45 (arguing that this represented one of the primary
justifications for excluding pregnancy from the scope of the ADA’s disabilities).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2008).
259. Alemzadeh, supra note 139, at 4 (arguing that the ADA should prevent pregnancy
discrimination because pregnancy substantially limits major life activities).
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E. Conclusion
Congress designed the antidiscrimination protections of the
PDA, FMLA, FLSA, and the ADAAA to intervene in the workplace
in ways that recognize the demands of work but also “address the
needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of
families, and to promote national interests in preserving family in-
tegrity.”260 This body of pregnancy discrimination protections
recognizes that there are many individuals who are dependent
upon working family members for care and it strives to reassure
workers that they “will not be asked to choose between continuing
their employment, and meeting their personal and family obliga-
tions or tending to vital needs at home.”261 Although the statutes
protect employees as individuals, the social aspects of the collective
(both the workplace and the family) and the inevitable require-
ments of vulnerability (for medical reasons, the birth or adoption
of a child, the care of a child, spouse, or parent, or the care of a
covered service member, etc.) are squarely at the heart of this mat-
ter. Efforts by Congress recognize not only the vulnerability of
families related to illness, medical issues, or the birth of a new
child, but also families’ economic vulnerabilities and the vulnerabil-
ity of employers. These schemes recognize that protecting workers
who may be vulnerable to job loss promotes “equal employment
opportunity for men and women.”262
In spite of these explicit purposes, courts interpreting these pro-
visions have determined that their protections do not extend to the
demands of the fourth trimester. The current pregnancy antidis-
crimination jurisprudence arising from federal law inadequately
addresses the fourth trimester’s demands. The next Sections pre-
sent initial thoughts on how and why the fourth trimester should be
incorporated into antidiscrimination law to address the inadequa-
cies of the current regime.
ARIA NO. 6
Three months have ended. Daily, I remind myself how lucky I am. My life
differs wildly from the experiences of my grandmothers and from other women
in the United States. My current class privilege in the United States and my
privilege as a woman in the global north mean continued access to health
260. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2013).
261. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101(b) (2013).
262. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101(a).
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insurance and a responsive supportive employer who accommodated my need
to recover and my desire to breastfeed.
And yet, I feel overwhelmed to be back at work. I exist day to day, at the
mercy of a relentless schedule where market work bleeds into care work and
housework for more than fourteen hours a day. Breastfeeding occupies my
nights and the sleeplessness drags on and on as medical fatigue sets in. I’m
starving—not just from sleep, but also from the hunger that arises from
Delilah’s reliance on breastfeeding. We’re in another growth spurt. What if
there is not enough milk while I am at work? What if Delilah cries and will
not be comforted?
ACT III: INCORPORATING THE FOURTH TRIMESTER
This Article proposes a conceptual shift in the way antidis-
crimination law understands pregnancy. Focusing on the insights of
professionals who care for and educate new mothers during the
early postpartum period, including midwives and maternal nurses,
it argues that judges, policymakers, and movement lawyers should
incorporate the fourth trimester into their understanding of preg-
nancy. To this end, it also proposes concrete ways to facilitate this
conceptual shift. The fourth trimester framework offers a “radical
tweak”263 to our current understanding of pregnancy and antidis-
crimination law that has the potential to destabilize the status quo
and provide a firmer foundation for antidiscrimination protection
for pregnant women.
This Section argues that judges, policy makers, and advocates
should adopt a fourth trimester framework and begins to discuss
how they could do so. It provides the initial sketch for reshaping
the scope and meaning of pregnancy in antidiscrimination law.
Currently, policymakers’ conceptualization of pregnancy fails to
provide support during the fourth trimester. This perspective
reduces pregnancy to the time between conception and the birth of
the infant, and treats pregnancy as an essentially biological state
that has a universally applicable beginning, middle, and end. While
this approach has some benefits as a limiting principle, it ultimately
fails to produce adequate protections against the multiple dimen-
sions of pregnancy discrimination that women face. It also fails to
provide clarity as to which conditions are medically related to preg-
nancy. As the fourth trimester framework reveals, the duration and
263. See Elizabeth A. Reilly, Radical Tweak—Relocating the Power to Assign Sex: From Enforcer
of Differentiation to Facilitator of Inclusiveness: Revising the Response to Intersexuality, 12 CARDOZO
J.L. & GENDER 297 (2005) (arguing for the removal of legal sex from birth certificates).
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end of pregnancy is physically, socially, and psychologically more
complicated than current understanding allows.
The fourth trimester framework that maternal nurses, midwives,
and lactation consultants routinely employ264 adopts a radical
reconceptualization of pregnancy that is useful for shaping law and
policy. For policymakers and judges, incorporating the fourth tri-
mester ensures that discrimination arising from animus toward
breastfeeding or infant care is prohibited and potentially provides
much needed consistency to the law of pregnancy discrimination.
The current statutory scheme does not need amending to incor-
porate the fourth trimester into the legal conception of pregnancy.
While some may argue that considering the fourth trimester re-
quires a legislative solution,265 the current congressional impasse
makes it unlikely that amendments will expand the current protec-
tions for pregnancy discrimination.266
Courts, administrative agencies, and movement lawyers have the
potential to address the challenges of continuing pregnancy dis-
crimination during the postpartum period by adopting a more
expansive understanding of the nature of pregnancy that includes
the fourth trimester. Incorporating the fourth trimester without
making changes to the current statutory framework can be accom-
plished in the following ways:
Incorporation through practice. In arguing for the expansion and
enforcement of antidiscrimination protections for their cli-
ents, lawyers should adopt an understanding of pregnancy that
embraces the fourth trimester.267 Those who practice employ-
ment discrimination law on behalf of pregnant plaintiffs,
particularly movement lawyers, should reframe pregnancy to
264. E.g., DAVIS, supra note 25.
265. E.g. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 15.
266. See Ezra Klein, Goodbye and Good Riddance, 112th Congress, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/04/goodbye-and-good-rid
dance-112th-congress/; Pregnancy and Employment Rights Posters, NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/html/publications/pregnancy-employment-
poster.shtml (last visited Aug. 28, 2014). As a part of a new law in New York that came into
effect on January 30, 2014, requiring employers to inform employees of their rights related to
pregnancy discrimination, the NYC Commission on Human Rights has created posters in
seven different languages that highlight the state’s new laws.
267. This is not a novel strategy. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Elizabeth Westfall, Decon-
structing the Maternal Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of “Careers” in the Workplace,
13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 31 (2006) (examining strategies that plaintiff’s lawyers could
use to redevelop the case law). While impact litigation has its limitations, this strategy can
help to educate the judiciary and invigorate grassroots organizing. Jill Maxwell, Leveraging the
Courts to Protect Women’s Fundamental Rights at the Intersection of the Family-Wage Work Structures
and Women’s Role as Wage Earner and Primary Caregiver, 20 DUKE. J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 127, 130
(2012).
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include a fourth trimester. Such a conceptual shift takes seri-
ously the reality that pregnancy discrimination continues after
the birth of the infant. Furthermore, lawyers should employ
the fourth trimester’s framework to argue that discrimination
related to breastfeeding, infant care, and recovery is more
than just discrimination related to pregnancy: it is pregnancy
discrimination. These lawyers should also introduce the exper-
tise of midwives and maternal nurses on the challenges and
requirements of the fourth trimester.
Incorporation through adjudication. Judges should understand
that pregnancy is not merely a physiological process of gesta-
tion that ends with the birth of an infant. In adjudicating these
claims, judges should consider drawing on the expertise of
those who spend their lives caring for pregnant women, partic-
ularly experts in maternal nursing and midwifery. The courts
should incorporate the perspective of these caregivers, particu-
larly midwives and maternal nurses, into its understanding of
pregnancy. This will reflect a more responsive and realistic
perspective on pregnancy.
Incorporation through agency guidelines. Agency actors can also
expand the legal understanding of pregnancy to include the
fourth trimester. For example, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission may adopt guidelines clarifying that the
scope of pregnancy,268 for the purposes of Title VII, should not
be defined in a “one-size-fits-all” biological fashion. Instead,
268. The EEOC, like other administrative agencies, may adopt guidelines to help courts
interpret federal statutes. Adoption of Questions and Answers To Clarify and Provide a Com-
mon Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures 44 Fed.
Reg. 43 (March 2, 1979), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_clarify_pro
cedures.html. This agency guidance is designed to aid in the day to day administration of the
statute, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Ress. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984),
and the agency may “fill in the gaps” of the statute that Congress left open. Mor-
ton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). Although these guidelines are not binding, they are
persuasive. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). Although these legislative
regulations agencies provide are presumed binding, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (noting that
agency regulations “are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or man-
ifestly contrary to the statute”), in practice courts do not always take these guidelines into
consideration in their analyses. William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2007); Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the
Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
1533 (1999). Judges do not consistently treat agency guidance as binding or precedential in
their interpretations of statutes. Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a
Canon, Not as a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Judges in Agency Deference Cases,
110 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1727 (2010) (providing empirical evidence that judges do not give
agency interpretations the weight of stare decisis).
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the agency may consider offering the fourth trimester frame-
work as an understanding of how pregnancy discrimination
continues after the birth of an infant. The EEOC could also
explicitly clarify the law by adopting guidelines that expand
the definition of pregnancy to include the fourth trimester.
Although adopting a fourth trimester framework alone may not
give rise to objective reinterpretations of antidiscrimination law, an
antidiscrimination law that starts from the presumption that preg-
nancy entails a fourth trimester has the potential to change the way
judges and policymakers think about pregnancy, pregnancy dis-
crimination, and work.
Extending the definition of pregnancy beyond forty weeks and
into the postpartum recovery period suggests to courts that, when
an employer discriminates against an employee who is recovering
from pregnancy, its actions constitute sex discrimination and are
prohibited. The fourth trimester reveals how complex and individ-
ual pregnancy can be for those who experience it. Universal
notions of one-size-fits-all pregnancy, which adopt presumptions
about capacities and incapacities in the workplace,269 fail to account
for how varied women’s experiences are during the fourth trimes-
ter. The impact, effects, and expenses of pregnancy as a culturally
mediated process do not have an objective physiological endpoint
that is universally applicable to all individuals. The discrimination
that potentially accompanies pregnancy is not categorically differ-
ent just because it occurs after the infant is born. While a fourth
trimester framework does not alleviate the valid concern that em-
ployers should accommodate the physical limitations of pregnancy,
women who face discrimination during the recovery period of their
pregnancy may receive some relief if pregnancy includes a fourth
trimester. It also means that courts and legal actors will begin to
recognize that pregnancy is relational and that the protections for
pregnancy discrimination benefit men and women with caretaking
obligations and their children, as well as the women who are
pregnant.270
Finally, starting from a fourth trimester framework, which con-
founds requirements for individualistic capacity and productivity
with notions of relational recovery and reproductivity, contributes
269. Grossman, supra note 11, at 578.
270. Calloway, supra note 13 (arguing that the obligation to accommodate pregnancy in
the workplace should be a legal obligation to ensure the health and well-being of children);
see also Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Parenting, and Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 61 (1997) (arguing
that law should take account of the needs and interests of young children).
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to a larger project of challenging the ideal worker norm that per-
vades employer expectations and courts’ determinations.271 An
explicit acknowledgement of how relational, emotional, and psy-
chological aspects of pregnancy impact the lives of women and men
in the workforce has the potential to push judges and policy makers
beyond their presumptions about pregnant workers and the nature
of work itself.
ACT IV: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EMBRACING THE FOURTH TRIMESTER
Although there are substantial policy benefits for expanding the
scope of pregnancy to recognize a fourth trimester, those who
adopt the fourth trimester framework may face a variety of compel-
ling objections from various stakeholders, commentators, judges,
employers, and even feminist scholars. This Section addresses the
costs and benefits of adopting a fourth trimester framework in or-
der to aid the efforts of commentators, judges, feminists, and
employers. It also engages with arguments against adopting a
fourth trimester framework, particularly from the perspective of
employers and feminist theorists.
A. The Theoretical Benefits of Adopting a Fourth Trimester Framework
Adopting a fourth trimester framework provides some novel the-
oretical benefits for those seeking to reconceptualize pregnancy in
legal theory and philosophy. The fourth trimester framework
reconceptualizes pregnancy, not as a highly individualized con-
trolled event, but as a process in which individuals interact in
relational units. Recognizing a fourth trimester framework chal-
lenges the presumption that pregnancy is a purely individual
endeavor. Recognizing the relational nature of pregnancy has the
potential to provide a foundation for arguing that the costs of preg-
nancy need to be distributed across society and not merely imposed
on individual pregnant women.
271. The ideal worker is an individual who works forty-hours throughout the year and has
no childbearing or caretaking responsibilities. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (2000). According to Williams,
most women in the United States remain economically marginalized because the best jobs, in
both blue-collar and white collar settings require workers to adhere to a masculine norm
which requires that one be available for extended periods of time without childbearing or
caretaking responsibilities. Id. at 113.
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A fourth trimester framework regards pregnancy as both individ-
ual and relational. Women, as individuals, suffer many of the
physical, economic, social, and psychological costs of pregnancy
and the costs of the discrimination that arise from it.272 However,
pregnancies and births occur within the social matrices of individ-
ual women’s relationships with others. Successful pregnancies are
often the product of a series of relational interactions between
pregnant women and their partners, their medical professionals,
their family members, their infants and children, their employers,
and their communities. An inflexible presumption of individualism
in the application of pregnancy discrimination law obscures the re-
lational realities of pregnancy in favor of the myth of the perfectly
pregnant individual, whose condition is freely chosen and easily
maintained. The costs of the fourth trimester in terms of time, phys-
ical energy, and absence from the workplace are not evenly
distributed. Current law requires that this perfectly pregnant indi-
vidual, with her unflagging ability to act and choose, be completely
capable of performing all of her workplace duties.
The fourth trimester concept provides a framework for under-
standing pregnancy consciously. It re-imagines pregnancy beyond
gestation and birth to de-center the physiological nature of preg-
nancy by acknowledging the importance of pregnancy’s social,
emotional, and psychological aspects. A pregnancy discrimination
policy that expands the conception of pregnancy to include a
fourth trimester would also force courts to move beyond a merely
biological or physiological notion of pregnancy. Currently, courts
that examine pregnancy discrimination are often concerned with
the biological and physiological aspects of pregnancy, particularly
the limitations of pregnancy and its impacts on productivity and
capacity in the workplace. The fourth trimester framework concep-
tualizes pregnancy as a process that entails not only biological
natural elements, but also social, emotional, and psychological ele-
ments. Lactation consultants, nurses, and midwives use the concept
of the “fourth trimester” as a guiding clinical framework to desig-
nate the important social, physical, and emotional transition away
from pregnancy and into the role of caregiver for a new infant.273
Such a conceptual framework, which recognizes social, emotional,
and psychological aspects of pregnancy, pushes courts to expand
272. Dinner, supra note 14. The costs of pregnancy could be distributed in other ways. See
e.g., Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1329 (1987)
(comparing the similarity between the cultural valuation of warriors and the cultural valua-
tion of mothers).
273. Eheart, supra note 67, at xiii.
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the scope of pregnancy discrimination protections to include pro-
tections against employers who discriminate against women in
relationship to infant care—one of the social and psychological as-
pects of the fourth trimester.
Defining the fourth trimester period’s dual nature as particular
and universal complicates it. Pregnancy is universal in nature be-
cause each individual has a connection to at least one pregnancy:
the one that gave him or her life.274 Pregnancy is particular and
specific because the experiences of women and their infants are
often profoundly individualized. While some generalities and aver-
age commonalities can characterize pregnancy, the lived
experiences of pregnant women are unique and specific to the indi-
vidual. For example, all individuals who give birth require a fourth
trimester period of recovery and restoration to guarantee a healthy
transition to motherhood. The particular elements of recovery and
restoration differ for each individual due to a diversity of circum-
stances. The woman who has a cesarean delivery may require a
longer recovery than a woman who gave birth in a vaginal deliv-
ery.275 However, not all vaginal deliveries are alike.276 Those women
who have had an episiotomy or severe tearing may require more
time to recover than women who did not. Similarly, individual cir-
cumstances of the fourth trimester can create profound inequalities
in the quality of recovery and transition. The working mother who
must return to employment immediately will have different fourth
trimester challenges related to breastfeeding and fatigue than the
working mother on maternity leave or the stay-at-home mother.
While those women may struggle and experience a lack of sleepless-
ness, the working mother’s additional responsibilities, combined
274. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Not of Woman Born: A Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 399, 445 (2012) (noting that “it is not only women who experience the connection and
dependency of gestation; it is everyone, at least so far”). While this gestating individual may
have a masculine or feminine gender presentation, or may be legally designated as a male or
a female, he or she must possess a womb capable of sustaining a fetus from conception
through birth.
275. Tulman & Fawcett, supra note 4 (finding differences in recovery times between
women who deliver vaginally and those who deliver via cesarean section).
276. For example, while many women have only minor problems during vaginal delivery,
some women who attempt vaginal delivery experience severe pelvic floor trauma that has
long-term consequences for pelvic organ prolapse, bowel dysfunction, and urinary inconti-
nence. Hans Peter Dietz, Pelvic Floor Trauma Following Vaginal Delivery, 18 CURRENT OPINION IN
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 528 (2006), available at http://sydney.edu.au/medicine/nepean/
research/obstetrics/pelvic-floor-assessment/Pelvic_Floor_Assessment/Publications_files/
Curr%20Opin%20OG%202006.pdf (arguing that further research is needed to determine
whether planned cesarean section delivery is preferable in some women who have a high risk
of severe pelvic floor trauma).
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with a lack of time to rest and recover, will create different chal-
lenges. Similarly, different circumstances and motivations among
women will shape their experience of the child’s birth. An affluent
college student who is surrendering her child for adoption will have
a different set of emotional concerns and challenges than a dis-
abled woman on Medicare who is pressured by social services to
surrender her infant. A surrogate mother who surrenders the infant
she carried because she has signed a contract will experience yet a
different set of emotional and financial challenges. The fourth tri-
mester recognizes these differences and has the potential to
facilitate a responsive antidiscrimination law related to pregnancy.
Undermining the dominance of physiological naturalism can de-
naturalize family creation and pregnancy, highlighting how
individuals forge family bonds through social and emotional
processes.
Adopting a perspective on pregnancy that includes the fourth tri-
mester may also contribute to the anti-essentialist project by
defining the legal understanding of pregnancy beyond the bounda-
ries of biological and physiological naturalism. Feminist
perspectives that regard pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimi-
nation reinscribe presumptions that pregnancy is a biological
phenomenon that is particularly female, which has the potential to
obscure and marginalize adoptive parents, same sex couples, and
transgender individuals.277 Defining pregnancy to incorporate the
fourth trimester has the potential to provide an additional founda-
tion for policy solutions that spread the risk and costs of
reproduction beyond the individual women who become pregnant.
More expansive antidiscrimination protections will ensure that
women and their families are protected during a critical time pe-
riod for the health and well-being of human beings. This care
during the early period of the fourth trimester can be crucial to
support women who have just given birth. In providing a model for
guiding postpartum communication follow-ups during the fourth
trimester, Nancy Donaldson noted that the assessments of nursing
during that period made a “critical difference” to the “concerned
and confused” families dealing with the challenges of a new in-
fant.278 During the fourth trimester, establishing an infant/
caretaker bond lays a crucial foundation for health and well-being
throughout an individual’s life. Such fourth trimester frameworks
also provide adequate support for breastfeeding and bonding,
277. Karaian, supra note 17, at 222–26 (arguing for a perspective that unsexes
pregnancy).
278. Donaldson, supra note 33.
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which pays dividends in terms of the health and recovery of
mothers and the health and well-being of infants.
B. Feminist Arguments Against the Fourth Trimester
One of the major challenges to the adoption of the fourth tri-
mester framework may come from feminist commentators and
scholars. These individuals may challenge the fourth trimester on
the grounds that it has the potential to perpetuate an essentialist
view of women that centers on the perspectives and experiences of
the most privileged women while marginalizing the experiences of
those whose life paths and choices differ. This woman worker is
essentially defined as a mother and by her biological role in repro-
duction. She is reduced to the fact that she has given birth to an
infant. Women who are mothers are also presumed to be the bio-
logical parent of the child, which marginalizes the experiences of
adoptive mothers and non-gestational mothers in same sex couples.
This concept of the fourth trimester, some feminists might argue,
also perpetuates essentialism because it has the potential to center
the experience of mothers who are white, able-bodied, and eco-
nomically privileged, particularly those who can afford the luxury of
a long period of recovery and bonding without performing market
work. It also centers the experiences of women who are partnered
or embedded in a family, obscuring the special fourth trimester dif-
ficulties that single mothers or mothers away from their homes and
communities might face.
This critique is to be expected, given the historical progress of
the feminist legal project. An antidiscrimination law that treats
pregnancy and pregnant women solely as individuals, without re-
gard to their relational roles in the home, has its benefits. Treating
pregnant women as individuals and not as members of a group bur-
dened by stereotypes and presumptions of incapacity has been a
crucial aspect of achieving more equality in the workplace. Further-
more, public policies that place the interests of women workers
above those of nonexistent, but potential, children have been cru-
cial in eroding the restrictions of repronormativity that presume
that a woman’s place is in the home and not in the world of market
work.
It is certainly true that adopting a fourth trimester framework
centers the lives and experiences of women who can conceive and
give birth to infants. During an intellectual moment when many
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scholars focus, rightfully, on masculinity and its influence on law,279
and other scholars, drawing on a critical trans* tradition which
decenters cissexual perspectives, argue for de-feminizing pregnancy
and centering on the experiences of pregnant men,280 a paradigm
that centers on women’s experiences might seem slightly retro-
grade. A focus on women who have given birth and the
predominantly female professionals who care for them may seem
too linked to identity politics, “second wave” notions of the femi-
nine, and essentialized notions of repronormativity.281 In the
circumstances that are described as optimal for infants during the
first three months of life, the bodies of women who have given birth
serve what some doctors, midwives, and maternal nurses, character-
ize as a unique and necessary site of responsive constant care. The
woman’s body, constructed as an essentially maternal body, is char-
acterized as “naturally” capable of and made for the intense
embodied around-the-clock care that neonates require. For exam-
ple, Christaine Northrup argues that the woman’s maternal body
“continues to serve a placental function. Designed by nature to sup-
port and nurture her newborn optimally, her body now sends
nutrients to the baby through her milk, her touch, and her physical
presence.”282
However, an understanding of the fourth trimester framework
need not be considered a throwback to essentialist notions of cul-
tural feminism.283 In fact, adopting a fourth trimester framework
could be considered a form of strategic essentialism284—a discursive
tactic that redefines and fixes the meaning of pregnancy in order to
rupture current presumptions and remake future perspectives.
Adopting a fourth trimester framework also begins to address the
intersectional inequalities between women by recognizing the im-
portance of the support and protections that all women require
279. FRANK RUDY COOPER & ANNE MCGINLEY, MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMEN-
SIONAL APPROACH (2012).
280. Karaian, supra note 17.
281. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law & Desire, 101 COLUM.
L. REV 181, 183–87 (2001) (arguing that feminist legal theory should move beyond danger
and repronormativity in its analysis of sexuality).
282. NORTHRUP, supra note 58, at 121.
283. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT (1982); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803,
835–38 (1990); William J. Turnier et al., Redistributive Justice and Cultural Feminism, 45 AM. U.
L. REV. 1275, 1277 (1996).
284. Strategic essentialism has often been attributed to Gayatri Spivak. See STEPHEN MOR-
TON, GAYATRI SPIVAK: ETHICS, SUBALTERNITY, AND THE CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON 127
(2007). However, some commentators associate strategic essentialism with Stuart Hall and
Kwame Anthony Appiah. CHRIS BARKER, CULTURAL STUDIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 250
(2012).
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before, during, and after the birth of an infant. While the fourth
trimester framework may start from the experiences of women as
mothers and professionals, it need not end there. Gleaned from the
experiences of women during pregnancy and the wisdom of those
who care for women during this time, the fourth trimester frame-
work should inform policy prescriptions that may answer the post-
identitarian demands of scholars concerned with the creation of
law and policies that are responsive to the universal vulnerability of
human beings. The concept of the fourth trimester stems from rec-
ognition of the potential dependency that women and infants
experience during and in the first months after the pregnancy. This
period of dependency stems from a potential for embodied vulner-
ability that is universally shared among human beings. As scholars
like Martha Fineman,285 Peadar Kirby,286 and Bryan Turner287 have
pointed out, every individual human being is vulnerable to depen-
dency, illness, and disability. Every human being has the potential,
through accident, illness, or chance, to become profoundly depen-
dent upon other individuals for the basic necessities of life and
sustained care. In spite of the promises of science fiction, every
human being who exists at this time spends the beginning of his or
her life cycle completely dependent upon the body of another—
specifically, a woman’s body. As Jennifer S. Hendricks notes, “it is
not only women who experience the connection and dependency
of gestation; it is everyone, at least so far.”288 Every human being,
whether they are reared by two parents of the same sex, two parents
of opposite sexes, three parents, or more is born from the body of a
woman. After the birth, all human beings are incredibly dependent
and require intensive attentive care to ensure their survival.
Whether one is a boss or worker, a mother or father, a tycoon or
pauper, we human beings start our lives in extreme dependency
and require the care of another individual.
One might also respond to charges of essentialism by illustrating
how the fourth trimester framework represents a paradigmatic ex-
ample of the type of embodied dependency that a responsive state
285. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Founda-
tional Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13
(2000).
286. Saru M. Matambanadzo, Embodying Vulnerability: A Feminist Theory of the Person, 20
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 45, 74 (2012).
287. Bryan S. Turner, The End(s) of Humanity: Vulnerability and the Metaphors of Membership,
3 HEDGEHOG REV. 7 (2001).
288. Hendricks, supra note 274, at 445. Hendricks continues: “Rather than looking at
pregnancy and concluding that women are especially connected to others, we could conclude
that everyone begins in a fundamental state of connected dependence.” Id.
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must take into consideration if it is to facilitate justice in outcomes
and fairness in opportunities. The intense requirements for physi-
cal recovery, social reimagination, and psychological adjustment
during the unwinding of the pregnancy during the fourth trimester
mandate supportive, responsive mechanisms for ensuring that all
parents of young infants receive not only antidiscrimination protec-
tions during this period but economic protections as well. The
universal nature of this embodied vulnerability is not wholly unre-
sponsive to individual difference, however. There is no reason to
presume that the physical aspects of this dependency will adhere to
a rigid time frame. The key to providing for the dependency that
arises from vulnerability is to recognize the unique and individual
nature of each person’s dependency and the type of responsiveness
that this dependency requires.
An underlying commitment to taking account of the fourth tri-
mester would necessarily highlight the inequalities that create
different outcomes and choices for different women along lines of
race and class. A commitment to ensuring fourth trimester protec-
tions for all women would also spur increased recognition that
many workers lack sufficient means to take unpaid leave to recover
and bond with their infants and are positioned in the labor market
in such a way that they are unable to negotiate more flexible and
responsive employment options during the fourth trimester period.
Arguing that policymakers should take greater care to account for
the challenges of the fourth trimester, further has the potential to
provide a starting ground for providing more consideration to the
needs of women who lack the economic means and social status to
negotiate their own fourth trimester space.
Women who belong to the upper middle class or the upper class
have the economic means to opt into the fourth trimester in ways
that women who are middle class, working class, or poor do not.
Individuals who do not have the financial means to purchase assis-
tance must rely on their family members or friends for help or must
make the recovery and transition of the fourth trimester alone.
Women in the upper-middle class or upper class may have employ-
ers who are more willing or able to accommodate the fourth
trimester period of recovery through paid leave and a flexible tran-
sition in returning to work, or even through telecommuting.
Perhaps responding to increasing need and demographic shifts,289
289. Ellen Ernst Kossek & Jesse S. Michel, Flexible Work Schedules, 1 APA HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (S. Zececk ed., 2011), available at http://ellen
kossek.lir.msu.edu/documents/finalsept8newdoc.pdf.
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many companies in the United States employ mechanisms for flexi-
ble work schedules.290
Most employers in the United States do not provide paid mater-
nity or paternity leave for workers. If they do, they often have
managed to limit this leave to only highly skilled high wage workers
in their firms through a combination of subcontracting out low
wage tasks, like mailroom work, secretarial work, or food services,
and excluding part-time workers. If these women work in profes-
sions that are perceived to be highly skilled, they may be considered
valuable or even irreplaceable members of the team, and therefore
have more access to paid parental leave. Lower wage workers, who
are perceived as interchangeable or “low skill,” may lack the lever-
age to request part-time work or may lose much needed family
benefits or wages if they request flexible schedules. So-called “low-
skill,” low-wage workers, who may lack control over which days of
the week they work and which shifts they are scheduled for, are also
less likely to have the ability to have a flexible schedule or
telecommute.
One might also respond to the charge of essentialism by illustrat-
ing how the fourth trimester reconstructs pregnancy as a process
that is not only biological and physiological, but also social, emo-
tional, and psychological. Policies that take account of the fourth
trimester must recognize not only the physiological and biological
changes that some caregivers who have given birth experience, but
also the complex social, emotional, and psychological aspects that
all caregivers of new infants must acclimate to. Instead of reducing
pregnancy to its biological and physiological aspects, a perspective
on pregnancy that incorporates the fourth trimester expands the
meaning and scope of pregnancy to account for psychological,
emotional, and social aspects of adjusting to birth. Such an account
of pregnancy has the potential to erode the dominance of physio-
logical naturalism in law and policy conversations about pregnancy
and infant care.
While a fourth trimester framework may increase understanding
about the individualized diversity of pregnancy and pregnancy’s re-
lational nature, it may also provide a foundation for thinking about
pregnancy as a relational process. Feminist scholars have argued
that pregnancy illustrates the ways in which identity is not solely
290. Kathleen Christensen, Flexible Staffing and Scheduling in U.S. Corporations, 240 RE-
SEARCH BULLETIN 1 (1989); Terence M. McMenamin, A Time to Work: Recent Trends in Shift
Work and Flexible Schedules, 130 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (2007).
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individual but is instead constituted through connections and rela-
tionships.291 The fourth trimester framework can be adapted to
recognize how the first three to six months of bonding and family
adjustment are crucial for infants and their caregivers, not just indi-
vidual women who have given birth and their infants. For all that a
fourth trimester framework feels like difference feminism and bio-
logical essentialism, it is a profoundly social concept. It is, in fact, a
reaction and deconstruction of presumptions about pregnancy and
a reconstruction of the concept around a more responsive social
concept.
C. Pro-Employer Arguments Against the Fourth Trimester
Commentators or legal actors who wish to adopt the fourth tri-
mester framework may face arguments that an antidiscrimination
regime incorporating the fourth trimester will inevitably lead to a
slippery slope where it is impossible to distinguish illegal pregnancy
discrimination from the reasonable expectations and actions of em-
ployers. The fourth trimester, due to its complex nature as a social,
emotional, psychological, and physiological framework, does not
lend itself to easily discerned limits. Requiring that the concept of
pregnancy be expanded to include the fourth trimester fosters an
imprecise conception of pregnancy that could lead to inefficiency.
Because the fourth trimester lacks an inherent limiting principle, it
would require fact-rich determinations that would utilize judicial re-
sources and create uncertainty for employers. Opening the concept
of pregnancy to recognize its complex diverse nature and the real-
ity that it is more than a physiological process, however, is a
necessary measure to expand legal understandings of pregnancy to
reflect women’s complex and diverse experiences with pregnancy.
The courts currently place arbitrary limits on the concept of preg-
nancy, reduce pregnancy to its physiological and biological
aspects,292 and narrow its temporal scope to the narrow forty-week
period between conception and birth. The current regime, which
requires that individuals be completely able to perform most as-
pects of their jobs or to leave the workforce during the fourth
291. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of
Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81 (1987) (arguing that women’s subjectivity is
defined by connection and not separation or individualism); supra note 257; Erika Bachiochi,
Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB
POL’Y 889, 942 (2011) (arguing that in a world where the dignity of human beings was appre-
ciated, “[p]regnancy would be valued – and cherished – for the gift it is”).
292. See supra note 9.
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trimester, wastes human capital as pregnant women are forced to
choose between the temporary demands of the fourth trimester
and their long-term careers.293
Others may argue that incorporating the fourth trimester will
create the potential for women who are not recovering or bonding
with their infants to abuse antidiscrimination protections. These
critics may also argue that incorporating the fourth trimester will be
administratively unworkable, due to its attention to the diverse and
unique individual circumstances of pregnancy. Those who would
seek to game the antidiscrimination can easily abuse this ineffi-
ciency. The potential for abuse and inefficiency in the current
regime, which arbitrarily marginalizes potentially productive
women workers who are only briefly hindered by dependency, how-
ever, dwarfs the potential to abuse the fourth trimester.294 For
example, with a PDA that permits employers to treat pregnant em-
ployees just as badly as they would treat similarly situated non-
pregnant employees295 and an FMLA that explicitly excludes part-
time workers,296 employers have some incentive to “race to the bot-
tom” by treating all employees badly and making most of them part-
time workers. Furthermore, under the current antidiscrimination
regime, which creates a lacuna of legal protection for women dur-
ing the fourth trimester, courts have interpreted current
antidiscrimination “protections” in ways that facilitate employer
abuse, inequality, and exclusion. The current regime tacitly permits
some types of pregnancy discrimination, such as discrimination
against individuals because of lactation and newborn infant care,
which seems intuitively pregnancy-related, deeming them to be
outside of the scope of discrimination the statute prohibits.297 Even
293. Grossman, supra note 11.
294. See id.
295. Although the PDA was Intended to be a floor and not a ceiling for antidiscrimina-
tion protections, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987), it has often been
interpreted as permitting employers to treat pregnant employees poorly so long as a similarly
situated nonpregnant employee would be treated in the same fashion. See discussion supra
pp. 128–31.
296. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR supra note 174.
297. E.g., Puente v. Ridge, 324 Fed. App’x 423 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that employer was
not required by PDA to make the accommodation of extra-long breaks for breastfeeding
mother to pump milk); Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988) (determining em-
ployer’s denial of breast-feeding leave did not give rise to a disparate impact claim); Falk v.
City of Glendale, No. 12-cv-00925-JLK, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87278 (D. Colo. June 25, 2012)
(finding employer who denied breastfeeding plaintiff private space to express milk and
breaks from work to do so did not violate the PDA because Title VII does not prohibit lacta-
tion discrimination); Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding
that breastfeeding is not a protected status); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487,
1492 (D. Colo. 1997) ( “[B]reast-feeding and child rearing concerns after pregnancy are not
medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth within the meaning of the PDA.”);
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where employers must take affirmative steps to accommodate em-
ployees’ fourth trimester needs, the current regime lacks
appropriate enforcement measures.298
Many may argue that the adoption of the fourth trimester will
not alleviate current antidiscrimination laws’ inadequacy and that
the current frameworks must be explicitly revised to accommodate
pregnancy and provide paid maternity leave. Furthermore, some
commentators will claim, the current pro-employer biases of courts
in the adjudication of antidiscrimination law would require a more
robust legislative response to facilitate the statutes’ objectives.299
Judges have shown great deference to employer preferences and an
unwillingness to require that the terms or conditions of work be
altered to accommodate difference and diversity.300 Some commen-
tators may even argue that the conceptual frameworks of
antidiscrimination law, which stem from an equality/identity ori-
ented perspective, cannot actually address the complexity and
nuance of difference and dependency that pregnancy discrimina-
tion embodies.301 This expansion of antidiscrimination law is not
likely to be realized in the short term. While the intervention of this
Article has its limits, the fourth trimester framework has the poten-
tial to redefine and reframe the nature and scope of pregnancy for
the purposes of law and policymaking. It provides a crucial starting
pointing for expanding the meaning and scope of pregnancy dis-
crimination protections to recognize the complex interaction
between social, physiological, and psychological challenges during
the fourth trimester.
Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (determining that although
breastfeeding is a uniquely female attribute, employer who denied employee unpaid leave to
breastfeed her infant did not engage in discrimination because of pregnancy and sex).
298. While § 207(r) of the FLSA may permit the Department of Labor to seek injunctive
relief for failure to accommodate employee requests for lactation breaks, see Reasonable
Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,073 (Dec. 10, 2010), some courts have
found that there is no way to enforce the requirement. See, e.g., Salz v. Casey’s Marketing Co.,
No. 11-CV-3055, 2012 WL 2952998, at *2 (2012). Even if there were a private right of action,
because § 207(r) does not require employees to be paid for lactation breaks, there is no lost
compensation for the employee to recover. Id. at 3; see also, EEOC v. Vamco Sheet Metals,
Inc., 2014 WL 2619812, at *6 (2014).
299. Trina Jones, Response: Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423 (2010)
(discussing the increasing difficulty of bringing a successful discrimination claim).
300. Michelle Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination
Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2005) (arguing that workplace essentialism shapes the defer-
ential way in which judges adjudicate antidiscrimination cases).
301. See Martha A. Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to
Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012) (arguing that an identity based antidiscrimination re-
gime cannot adequately address existing social and economic vulnerabilities).
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D. Administrative Arguments Against the Fourth Trimester
This Article is committed to an articulation of the fourth trimes-
ter that reflects the permeable boundaries of self and other that
exist for caregivers and infants during the fourth trimester. It has
explicitly rejected the impulse to reduce the fourth trimester to a
rigid, rule-bound collection of physiological symptoms. Instead, the
fourth trimester must be understood from a perspective that re-
gards its amorphous nature as its foundational strength. Part of the
conceptual power of the fourth trimester is that it provides ways to
think about how caregivers (particularly mothers) and infants tran-
sition away from pregnancy and toward recovery and
reconceptualization, while also recognizing that interdependency
and vulnerability remain a salient reality for many months after ges-
tation ends. This move also defers, appropriately, to the fields of
maternal nursing and midwifery where recovery and transitional
processes are regarded as individualized.
By definition and design, the fourth trimester is as flexible, re-
sponsive, and highly individualized as the women and infants who
transition through it. For this reason, one of the most compelling
challenges to incorporating the fourth trimester into various as-
pects of law comes from the reality that legal actors, particularly
judges and legislators, may prefer bright line rules for inclusion and
exclusion. Such bright line frameworks, which clearly determine
who is “in” and who is “out,” are easily applied to all similarly situ-
ated individuals in the context of antidiscrimination protections.
For individuals who prefer “bright line” tests, the responsive, highly
individualized nature of the fourth trimester presents an “adminis-
trative nightmare.” For example, judges attempting to expand the
boundaries of pregnancy discrimination by adopting the fourth tri-
mester may have a difficult time distinguishing between individuals
seeking antidiscrimination protections for fourth trimester-related
discrimination, which the PDA would hypothetically cover,302 those
seeking antidiscrimination protections for a temporary disability
caused by pregnancy, which is covered under the ADAAA,303 or
those seeking antidiscrimination protections for caregiver discrimi-
nation, which is covered by Title VII only in limited
circumstances.304
302. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e(k).
303. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
304. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE
TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES, NO. 915.002 (May 23, 2007) (not-
ing that while “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based solely on parental or other
FALL 2014] The Fourth Trimester 179
These individuals also claim that adopting the fourth trimester in
pregnancy discrimination has the potential to lead down a slippery
slope where all types of differential treatment of employees with
children would become verboten. While this Article adopts a more
agnostic notion of the fourth trimester, which is defined by its rela-
tional and individualized nature, it is possible that policymakers can
incorporate the fourth trimester into existing legal frameworks to
provide bright lines for rule making.
The fourth trimester can be adopted in ways that provide more
administrative certainty. How the fourth trimester would be incor-
porated into current legal frameworks depends considerably upon
whether it is adopted through judicial incorporation, agency inter-
pretation, or statutory amendment. However, there are some ways
that the fourth trimester can be incorporated to limit its scope and
yet maintain the essential essence of the concept. Adopting the
fourth trimester for ease of administration may be accomplished,
for example, by using the three-month “trimester” time period as a
guideline for coverage. While this may mean that women with ex-
traordinary fourth trimester circumstances are forced to seek
antidiscrimination protections for their own limitations under the
ADAAA, for their care responsibilities under the FMLA, or the
evolving “caregiver” protections of Title VII, it would provide a
bright line limit to the scope of pregnancy that more accurately
reflects the ways in which women gradually transition from preg-
nant to nonpregnant. Another mechanism for adopting the fourth
trimester framework could be to create a rebuttable presumption
protecting individuals from pregnancy discrimination during the
three to six months after birth. Individual plaintiffs bringing an-
tidiscrimination claims who articulate their injuries as pregnancy
discrimination during the fourth trimester would receive the pro-
tections of a rebuttable presumption. The employer would have the
burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-fourth
trimester related reason for the action taken against the employee.
While the counter arguments against adopting the fourth trimes-
ter approach may seem persuasive to many, they must be weighed
against equally strong arguments for adopting a concept that has
the potential to augment the effectiveness of protections for preg-
nant workers. Some may argue that incorporating the fourth
trimester into antidiscrimination law may create inefficiencies by
shifting the social and economic costs of pregnancy to employers.
caregiver status,” some forms of caregiver discrimination that are based on sex are prohib-
ited), available  http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html#caregive (last visited May
19, 2014).
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This cost-shifting, these critics argue, might create incentives not to
hire women in the workplace305 and exacerbate existing cognitive
biases against women and pregnant workers.306 While expanding
the scope of pregnancy in law to include the fourth trimester may
entail a certain amount of cost-shifting and impose additional bur-
dens on employers who are willing to hire women, incorporating
the fourth trimester has positive social value because it spreads the
risks and costs of pregnancy more equitably. Under the current an-
tidiscrimination regime, the costs and risks of pregnancy are
individualized and privatized so that women internalize these costs
even as employers and childless individuals may reap the social ben-
efits arising from childrearing.307 Without incorporating the fourth
trimester, individual pregnant women will internalize the costs and
risks of proper recovery, bonding, and care immediately following
the birth of an infant, while others enjoy the future benefits.
ARIA NO. 7
Month four arrives like the dawn. Delilah smiles at me with recognition.
She is now interacting, a real separate person. So am I. Delilah and I were
intimately intertwined. As part of the lucky minority of working women who
are able to take some leave after the birth of their children, I slept when she
slept, ate when I could, fed her constantly, and continued to feel as if my
pregnancy never ended. I was not alone. Many women spend the first three
months after gestation in a state of physical, emotional, and social flux,
crying through hormones in new strangely changed bodies with what looks to
many like a tiny aged alien attached them for more hours of the day than
they could have imagined. These experiences are typical during the postpar-
tum months of “the fourth trimester.” Drawing on the notion of the fourth
trimester, I gave myself permission to sleep when she slept, to recover slowly,
to let the housework go, to learn parameters of motherhood, and to become a
separate person. The ebb and flow of becoming unpregnant was like the tide,
flowing in and out at its own pace. The high tide of my pregnancy did not
begin with one wave, but with a series of tiny waves flowing in and out
until it revealed the sand and tide pools of my individual self. When it
ultimately receded, the physical, social, and psychological work of pregnancy
was complete, and the work of motherhood had begun.
305. See Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 197 (1989).
306. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
307. Dinner, supra note 14.
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CONCLUSION
The fourth trimester challenges the pervasive presumptions that
pregnancy can be reduced to its biological aspects and temporarily
confined to the period between conception, gestation, and birth. It
adopts an interdisciplinary understanding of pregnancy that ac-
counts for its physiological and biological nature while also
considering its emotional, psychological, and social aspects. Adopt-
ing an understanding of pregnancy that includes the fourth
trimester challenges the perception that pregnancy’s biological as-
pects and its physiological duration define pregnancy. The fourth
trimester framework recognizes that the scope of pregnancy does
not necessarily begin with conception and end with the birth of the
child. Pregnancy, as the fourth trimester reveals, is not necessarily a
linear event with rigid notions of a beginning, middle, and end.
Incorporating a fourth trimester framework into existing antidis-
crimination protections will aid in building an antidiscrimination
regime that is more responsive to pregnancy discrimination be-
cause it redefines the scope of pregnancy beyond gestation and
birth and into the period of recovery and transition. By extending
the scope of the pregnancy, the fourth trimester framework con-
ceptualizes pregnancy not as an event of a fixed forty week time
period, but as a process. To quote Reva Rubin, while the birth of
the infant may be the highlight of the pregnancy, it is “not the end
of the childbearing experience.”308 This notion that pregnancy is a
process and not a fixed temporal event has the potential to shift the
boundaries of federal antidiscrimination protections.
The current protections against pregnancy discrimination policy
in the workplace should be amended to recognize the complica-
tions and needs of the fourth trimester. Judges and policymakers
should consider the fourth trimester framework as a lens for under-
standing the scope of pregnancy and the costs it imposes upon
women. While recognizing the fourth trimester is an imperfect and
incomplete answer to the various problems of pregnancy discrimi-
nation in the workplace, it starts the process of constructing a more
responsive, complex, and accurate understanding of pregnancy in
law. Without the recognition of the fourth trimester and the social,
psychological, and physiological realities it entails, federal antidis-
crimination protections will continue to fall short.
308. RUBIN, supra 19.

